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Introduction
Since 1996, Justice Anthony Kennedy has authored the four Supreme Court decisions
recognizing the rights and dignity of homosexuals in America. In Romer v. Evans (1996),1
Justice Kennedy struck down a state constitutional amendment barring anti-discrimination laws
from covering sexual orientation. In Lawrence v. Texas (2003),2 he struck down state bans on
homosexual sodomy. In United States v. Windsor (2013),3 he struck down the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), a federal law that defined marriage as a union between a man and a
woman. Recently he wrote the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, the 5-4 decision
declaring that state bans on same-sex marriage and laws prohibiting the recognition of same-sex
marriages legally performed elsewhere were unconstitutional.4 While Anthony Kennedy will go
down in history as the justice who first recognized and then cemented the idea that gays and
lesbians deserve equal rights and dignity, he will also be remembered in some circles for what he
did not say in his gay rights opinions.
In each of the cases above, Justice Kennedy managed to rule in favor of gay rights
without determining the standard of review, or level of scrutiny, for laws that classify persons
based on their sexual orientation. While in each of the cases before Obergefell there were reasons
why Kennedy chose to not determine the standard of review, those in Obergefell have frustrated
many since the decision came out. This paper seeks to examine Justice Kennedy’s gay rights
jurisprudence to demonstrate the consistent characteristics of his opinions in Romer, Lawrence,
Windsor, and finally Obergefell. While it is undeniable that his opinions asserted that the
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Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
3
United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (2013).
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Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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Constitution guarantees homosexuals equal protection and due process under the law, ultimately
his decision to eschew determining the standard of review for sexual orientation has resulted in
concrete harm for homosexuals and the rest of the LGBT community.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell had many undeniably positive aspects, and
established that the Fourteenth Amendment afforded same-sex couples equal dignity and the
fundamental right to marry. However, in many states gays and lesbians can still be legally fired
from their jobs, denied a loan, or denied service in a restaurant simply for being homosexual.
While determining the standard of review would not have ended all discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, it would have given the LGBT community and those defending their rights
a concrete tool to use against persons who, especially after Obergefell, seek a right to be exempt
from issuing marriage licenses or following anti-discrimination laws because of religious
objections.
Chapter I will briefly discuss the gay rights movement and how the push for same-sex
marriage developed in the twentieth century. Chapter II discusses Justice Kennedy’s background
as a lawyer and judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and on the Supreme Court. Section
two of that chapter examines an opinion he wrote in 1980 ultimately ruling against gay rights,
while also revealing his progressive attitude towards gay rights and homosexuals as human
beings in a legal context. Section three of that chapter outlines Justice Kennedy’s gay rights
jurisprudence on the Supreme Court, with detailed analysis of his opinions in Romer, Lawrence,
and Windsor. Chapter III outlines Obergefell v. Hodges from the case’s beginnings with various
same-sex couples in four different states, to the decision. Chapter IV outlines and analyzes the
arguments of the four dissenting opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges and the merits of each.
Chapter V discusses and analyzes the criticisms of Kennedy’s opinion on the part of those who

2

agreed with the ultimate outcome but decried the opinion for not determining the standard of
review. The concluding chapter will examine the situations that have arisen in light of the lack of
a clear standard of review and will conclude with recommending a remedy for the current
situation. This paper argues that the Court will eventually have to rule that sexual orientation is a
suspect or quasi-suspect class and eventually the federal government will amend antidiscrimination laws to cover sexual orientation and gender identity.
While throughout the paper I discuss the rights of homosexuals and the need for a clear
standard determining the level of scrutiny for laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation,
I write with the understanding that should the Court determine the standard, or had Kennedy
done so in Obergefell, it would protect the LGBT community in a comprehensive sense.
Therefore, while at many points of this thesis I discuss the rights and dignity of same-sex
marriage, gays, lesbians, and same-sex couples, that discussion is written with the understanding
that the arguments I make and the analysis I provide apply with full force to other members of
the LGBTQ community. That is not to demean the rights or liberties of persons discriminated
against or denied protections based on gender identity, but to make this paper cohesive, it was
necessary to be consistent in the language.

3

Chapter I
The Gay Rights Movement and the Road to Same-Sex Marriage
Gay Rights in America: A Brief Summary
Although the gay rights agenda pursuing marriage equality has taken center stage in
recent years, the gay rights movement and the struggle for equality outside of marriage began
more than half a century ago. In the 1950s, the American Psychiatric Association considered
homosexuality a “sociopathic personality disturbance,” and homosexuals were abhorred for their
“lifestyle,” which was viewed as unclean and immoral by society.1 This grave misunderstanding
of homosexuality created a sense of fear in hetero-normative America that led to the
criminalization and oppression of homosexuals. During this time, homosexuals were legally
barred from working for the U.S. government or serving in the military if they were open about
their sexuality, and homosexual acts were sufficient to deny or revoke licenses to practice
medicine, law, or nursing.2 Even organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
deemed laws condemning homosexual acts constitutional as homosexuals were “socially
heretical or deviant.”3 Understandably, many homosexuals hid their sexuality in fear of social
persecution, and as a result, there was very little organized activism for the gay rights agenda
during this time.
In the 1960s, although every state in America had laws barring even private, consensual,
same-sex intimacy,4 civil libertarians and organizations like the American Law Institute rejected

1

"Timeline: Milestones in the American Gay Rights Movement," PBS, last modified June 24, 2011, accessed
December 11, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/stonewall/.
2
Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, xx and 11.
3
Ibid., 6
4
Ibid., 3
4

the criminal punishment of private sex between consenting adult homosexuals.5 Simultaneously,
American society started to change its perception of previously contentious issues such as
divorce, contraception, sexual mores, and the sexual content of mass media.6 In 1965 the
Supreme Court ruled in Griswold v. Connecticut that a Connecticut statute criminalizing the
distribution of, or medical recommendation of, contraceptives was unconstitutional.7 Justice
William Douglas wrote the majority opinion for the Court and argued that certain rights of
privacy concerning the intimate relationships of consenting adults were beyond government
control, particularly the right of marriage and marital intimacy.8 Furthermore, though these rights
were not included in the Constitution, Douglas established that certain guarantees within the Bill
of Rights include penumbras, or zones, which incorporate unenumerated rights not explicitly
stated in the text. Justice Douglas reasoned in Griswold, the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments offer additional protections that went beyond the exact language of the text and
created a new constitutional right to privacy in marital relations.
Two years later, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Loving v. Virginia that state
laws banning and criminalizing interracial marriages were unconstitutional.9 Chief Justice Earl
Warren argued that the anti-miscegenation laws violated the fundamental right to marry and
constituted invidious racial discrimination under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 The Court also rejected the notion that equal application
of a statute containing racial classifications was enough to protect the classification from
Fourteenth Amendment review. In other words, the Court did not accept that the statutes could

5

Ibid., 10
Ibid., 8
7
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8
Ibid.,
9
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
10
Ibid., 12
6

5

be justified simply because the Virginia law punished blacks and whites equally.11 The Court
also noted it regarded statutes that made distinctions between people because of their ancestry as
“odious” and argued they were contradictory to the American doctrine of equality.12 Perhaps
most importantly, the Court made clear that:
The Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in
criminal statutes, be subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny,’…and, if they are ever to be
upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible
state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the
Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.13
Using this strict standard of judicial review, the Court held the state had no compelling
overriding purpose other than discrimination to justify the statutes. Regarding the Due Process
Clause, the Court held that the laws denied the Lovings’ liberty without due process of law and
held that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of the happiness of free men.”14 In a twelve page opinion, the Court
unanimously struck down what was arguably the last form of legal, institutionalized,
discrimination against blacks in America.
Though Griswold and Loving were steps in the right direction for marriage equality, there
still was no significant organization or push for same-sex marriage within the gay rights
movement itself. In the 1950s, homophile organizations like the Mattachine Society started
merely discussing “marriage-like” relationships, and the Daughters of Bilitis did not see
marriage as a priority.15 Other activists were more vocal about their opposition to marriage as an

11

Ibid., 8
Hirabayahi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) cited in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
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Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
15
Suzanne Sherman, introduction to Lesbian and Gay Marriage: Private Commitments, Public Ceremonies
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 6.
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oppressive, sexist, and inherently heterosexual institution that should not be pursued.16 Marriage,
they argued, should be weakened and repealed by an alternative that allowed all people,
homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, to develop their own understandings of love and family.17
These advocates argued that the twofold purpose of the gay rights movement was for the
affirmation of gay identity in American society and the validation and acceptance of intimate,
committed relationships other than marriage.18 According to them, the legalization of same-sex
marriage encouraged gays to assimilate with hetero-normative society and strengthened the
oppressive institution of marriage -- both of which undermined the main goals of the movement.
One such critic was Paula Ettelbrick, former lawyer of Lambda Legal,19 who argued that
the legalization of same-sex marriage would make the homosexual community “invisible” as
homosexual married couples joined the mainstream.20 Ettelbrick argued that homosexuals in
America were proud of their differences from heterosexuals and subsequently wanted to be
recognized and accepted by society considering those differences. Furthermore, society’s
disqualification of marriage as the pinnacle of commitment and acceptance -- not the right to
marry -- would give gays and lesbians justice and full recognition of their relationships.21
Therefore, by arguing for equal treatment under the law and fighting to enter into the institution
of marriage, homosexuals must accept all of its oppressive characteristics and have their
16

Andrew Sullivan, Same-sex Marriage, Pro and Con: A Reader (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 117; Joyce
Murdoch and Deb Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v. The Supreme Court (New York: Basic Books,
2001), 168; David L. Chambers, "Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership," in Creating Change:
Sexuality, Public Policy, and Civil Rights, by John D'Emilio, William B. Turner, and Urvashi Vaid (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 2000), 282.
17
Sullivan, Same-sex Marriage, Pro and Con, 117; Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians,
168.
18
Paula L. Ettelbrick, "Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage: Private
Commitments, Public Ceremonies, ed. Suzanne Sherman (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 21 .
19
"Who We Are," Lambda Legal, accessed February 6, 2016, http://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us. (Lambda Legal
is the oldest and largest national organization whose mission is to achieve full recognition of the civil rights of
lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transgender people and those with HIV through impact legislation, education, and
public policy work.)
20
Ettelbrick, "Since When Is Marriage," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage, 21.
21
Ibid., 22
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relationships regulated by the state.22 In other words, if same-sex couples were allowed to marry,
society may look upon same-sex couples that choose not to marry with disdain just as society
does for heterosexual couples who choose not to marry.23 To Ettelbrick, the agenda of the gay
rights movement was simple:
Until the Constitution is interpreted to respect and encourage differences, pursuing the
legalization of same-sex marriage would be leading our movement into a trap; we would
be demanding access to the very institution that, in its current form, would
undermine our movement to recognize many different kinds of relationships.24
This is not to say that opponents of same-sex marriage within the gay rights movement did not
understand why some same-sex couples would want to seek marriage. To this point, Ettelbrick
notes, “[m]arriage provides the ultimate form of acceptance for personal, intimate relationships
in our society, and gives those who marry an insider status of the most powerful kind.”25 Given
the importance society gives to marriage, it therefore was not surprising that some same-sex
couples wanted to enter into the institution and become insiders.26 However, Ettelbrick also
recognized that this right would not be for the homosexual community as a whole; rather, it
would be sought by couples who are closer to the “norm” of society with their race, gender, and
economic status because:27
The law looks to the insiders as the norm, regardless of how flawed or unjust their
institutions, and requires that those seeking the law’s equal protection situate themselves
in a similar posture to those who are already protected. In arguing for the right to legal
marriage, lesbian and gay men would be forced to claim that we are just like heterosexual
couples, have the same goals and purposes and vow to structure our lives similarly.
The law provides no room to argue that we are different but are nonetheless entitled to
equal protection.28

22

Ibid., 21
Ibid., 22
24
Ibid., 23
25
Ibid., 20-21
26
Ibid., 20-21
27
Ibid., 24
28
Ibid., 23
23
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In contrast to this view, there were some within the gay rights movement who thought
marriage should be the center, or at least considered part, of the gay rights agenda. Even activists
like Thomas Stoddard -- who worked with Ettelbrick at Lambda, and served as its executive
director from 1986 to 1992, who viewed marriage as oppressive, and who did not want to seek
marriage for himself -- saw value in marriage.29 He argued there were compelling practical,
political, and philosophical reasons why every homosexual should have the right to marry the
person of their choice, and why the gay rights movement should aggressively seek legal
recognition of same-sex marriage.30 In a practical sense, there are immense economic advantages
to marriage. These include: inheriting from your spouse if there is no will; ensuring a surviving
spouse receives social security benefits; obtaining citizenship for one’s foreign-born spouse; and
immunity from subpoenas requiring testimony against one’s spouse.31 Additionally, outside of
the legal spectrum, many employers provide health insurance and inclusion in employee benefits
packages.
Politically, the legalization of same-sex marriage would do the most to test the dedication
of married heterosexuals to full gay equality, and would push society towards ending
discrimination against homosexuals in America.32 Homosexuals also began to realize how
attaching same-sex couples to love, an emotion strongly associated with marriage, helped to ease
homophobic notions and made homosexuals appear more like heterosexuals.33 However,

29

David W. Dunlap, "Thomas Stoddard, 48, Dies; An Advocate of Gay Rights," The New York Times, last
modified February 14, 1997, accessed February 6, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/14/nyregion/thomasstoddard-48-dies-an-advocate-of-gay-rights.html.
30
Thomas B. Stoddard, "Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage: Private
Commitments, Public Ceremonies, ed. Suzanne Sherman (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 14.
31
Ibid., 15; Michael J. Rosenfeld, The Age of Independence: Interracial Unions, Same-sex Unions, and the
Changing American Family (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 174.
32
Stoddard, "Why Gay People Should," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage, 17.
33
John D'Emilio, "Will the Courts Set Us Free? Reflections on the Campaign for Same-Sex Marriage," in The
Politics of Same-sex Marriage, ed. Craig A. Rimmerman and Clyde Wilcox (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007), 41-42.
9

activists did not believe that marriage was the quick fix for homophobia, and they understood the
legalization of same-sex marriage would not eradicate opposition to homosexuality, just as the
Loving decision did not eradicate racism or opposition to interracial marriage.34 Despite this
reality, however, Stoddard noted:
Griswold called marriage a “noble” and “sacred” institution and homosexuals have been
denied entry into it. The implicit message is this: two men or two women are incapable of
achieving such an exalted domestic state. Gay relationships are somehow less significant,
less valuable. Such relationships, may, from time to time and couple to couple give the
appearance of marriage, but they can never be of the same quality or importance.35
Philosophically, Stoddard recognized that abolishing marriage as the cornerstone of relationships
in America was rather unlikely, however, opening the institution of marriage to same-sex
couples would “necessarily transform it into something new.”36 Furthermore he framed the issue
as homosexuals desiring the right to marry not necessarily desiring to marry.37
While the arguments for marriage were beginning to surface in some circles, the overall
consensus within the movement was that there were other, more important aspects of gay
equality in America to focus on first. During this time gay rights organizations began to attract
more members and more progressive wings of the movement began calling for equal rights and
direct action. These progressives rejected the earlier generations’ desire to assimilate, educate the
public, and let social scientists address the rights and treatments of homosexuals in America.38
These “progressive” gay rights activists began to pursue legal action and had some success in
challenging the closing of gay bars and dismissal of homosexual service members.39 One of the
hallmark events of this period was the 1969 Stonewall Inn Rebellion in Greenwich Village where

34

Rosenfeld, The Age of Independence, 189.
Stoddard, "Why Gay People Should," in Lesbian and Gay Marriage, 18.
36
Ibid., 19.
37
Ibid., 18.
38
Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 11.
39
Ibid., 12
35
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police raided the gay bar and patrons fought back in self defense. This was the “shot heard
‘round the world” for the gay rights movement and set in motion a series of events that catalyzed
significant constitutional changes in America.40
A Call for Marriage: Baker v. Nelson and Beyond
Although the legalization of same-sex marriage was not at the forefront of the gay rights
movement, there were murmurs from certain gay rights groups and same-sex couples who saw
the validation of their relationships as the centerpiece of their push for gay equality. One such
couple was Mike McConnell and Jack Baker, a Minnesota couple who first brought the question
of same-sex marriage to the Supreme Court.
At a Halloween party in 1966, McConnell and Baker met and fell in love.41 In 1971 they
filed for a marriage license in Minnesota, their application was denied, and they subsequently
filed suit against the Hennepin County District Clerk.42 The plaintiffs argued that the Minnesota
marriage statute did not expressly prohibit same-sex marriage and therefore their marriage
should be authorized. Interpreting the state statute to allow only heterosexual marriage was
unconstitutional under the Ninth Amendment, which states that rights not explicitly granted by
the Constitution are not necessarily denied to them. Furthermore, they argued restricting
marriage to heterosexual couples denied them due process and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment and constituted irrational and invidious discrimination. Lastly, as
established in Griswold and Loving, they argued the government could not impede on the
intimacy of two consenting adults, and that the Constitution guaranteed the right to marry the

40

Ibid., 17-18
Joyce Murdoch and Deb Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v. the Supreme Court (New York: Basic
Books, 2001), 164.
42
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, (Minn. Supreme Court 1971).
41
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person of one’s choosing.43 Despite these arguments, they lost their case in the Minnesota trial
court and appealed the decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court.44
On October 15, 1971 the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. Nelson that there
was no constitutional violation in denying Baker and McConnell a marriage license, and that
restricting marriage to opposite sex couples was neither irrational nor proof of invidious
discrimination.45 In other words, the court rejected the applicability of Loving, arguing there was
a clear distinction between a marital restriction based on race and one based on sex.46 The Loving
decision, therefore, did not imply that all restrictions on marriage were in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, just restrictions that were created to discriminate. Furthermore, the court
held that states were able to control marital eligibility and Griswold applied only to heterosexual
relationships. The court also focused on the link between marriage and procreation, citing the
Book of Genesis to reason on biological grounds that marriage should be restricted to a man and
a woman.47
The petitioners appealed this ruling to the United States Supreme Court, which then
dismissed the case on the merits in 1972, stating that it did not present a substantial federal
question.48 With the Supreme Court’s one line dismissal, the Baker decision in the Minnesota
Supreme Court was binding. Though the ruling was a blow to same-sex marriage, it also marked
a turning point in the gay rights movement because gay activists began to raise other issues

43

Ibid.,
David L. Chambers, "Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership," in Creating Change: Sexuality,
Public Policy, and Civil Rights, by John D'Emilio, William B. Turner, and Urvashi Vaid (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 2000), 284.
45
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, (Minn. Supreme Court 1971).
46
Ibid.,
47
Ibid., (“The institution of marriage as a union of a man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and
rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis”).
48
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (“Appeal from Sup. Ct. Minn. Dismissed for want of substantial federal
question”).
44
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concerning LGBT rights such as sodomy laws, bans on openly serving in the military,
homophobic violence, and discrimination in employment, housing, and healthcare.49
In the 1970s about half of the states repealed their sodomy laws and by 1973 the
American Psychiatric Association had removed homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses.50
In 1975 the U.S. Civil Service Commission lifted its ban on employing homosexuals, and several
localities began to bar discrimination based on sexual orientation.51 Despite these gains, efforts
to revoke the bans on homosexuals serving in the military failed, and courts tended to reject
challenges to the policy.52 Additionally, in cases brought regarding same-sex marriage in some
states, courts rejected any legal argument for gay marriage and argued, similarly to Baker, that
although many states did not define marriage between a man and a woman, the legislature
intended to preserve that traditional understanding in the creation of its laws.53 However, there
were some progressive judges who were becoming more supportive of the idea, and some even
spoke of gays as a group entitled to special judicial protection because, as a group, they were
historically disadvantaged and still suffering from invidious discrimination.54
The AIDS epidemic of the 1980s marked a tangible shift in the gay rights movement that
slowly galvanized homosexuals to seek legal recognition of their relationships. Within the gay
community, AIDS forced closeted homosexuals to come out about their sexuality, which in turn

49

Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 48; D'Emilio, "Will the Courts Set Us Free?," in The Politics of Same-sex,
40-41.
50
Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 13 and 23.
51
Ibid., 23
52
Ibid., 30
53
Andrew Sullivan, Same-sex Marriage, Pro and Con: A Reader (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 96; Klarman,
From the Closet to the Altar, 19. See Jones v. Hallahan 501 S.W.2d 588 (1973) (Kentucky Court of Appeals argued
that marriage “has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman and we have been presented with no
authority to the contrary”); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 11 Wash. App. 247, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (Ct. App.
1974)(Washington Court of Appeals held that not allowing same-sex couples to marry was not sex discrimination
because child rearing is essential to marriage rights)).
54
Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar, 41 footnote 137. (NGTF v. Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270
(10th Cir. 1984); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
13

made people see gays not as criminals and pedophiles, but as friends, family, and colleagues.
Additionally, the epidemic revealed the vulnerability of same-sex relationships, as many
homosexuals who lost partners to AIDS had little to no protections or rights when their partner
was ill in the hospital, or after they had passed away from the disease.55 Additionally, many gay
men faced hardships gaining access to medical insurance to pay for the expensive treatments,
medications, and hospital visits since many employers offered coverage to spouses of employees,
but not to a worker’s unmarried partner.56 Perhaps most importantly, more homosexuals who
previously did not view their relationships as a fundamentally important aspect of their life began
to see them in a new light while caring for ill partners who were infected with the AIDS virus.57
In the 1980s, the number of gay men who became involved in political efforts grew
substantially because their lives were affected by AIDS, and many of them sought a more active
and responsive role from the state.58 In San Francisco particularly, the push for legalizing
domestic partnerships and putting more funds towards AIDS research and awareness gained
support. This change was partly due to the work of Harry Britt, an openly gay member of the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors and its future president, who proposed domestic partnership
legislation in 1982 only to have it vetoed by then Mayor Diane Feinstein.59 In 1989 a domestic
partnership ordinance was adopted by the Board of Supervisors, rejected by voters, proposed

55

Ibid., 39; D'Emilio, "Will the Courts Set Us Free?," in The Politics of Same-sex, 49. (“Many [gay men] faced
situations where the phrase ‘next of kin’ came into play: hospital visitation rights; decision making about medical
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David L. Chambers, "Tale of Two Cities: AIDS and the Legal Recognition of Domestic Partnerships in San
Francisco and New York," Law and Sexuality 2 (1992): 184.
57
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59
Ibid., 183 (Britt also tried again in 1983, but Feinstein threatened to veto and the legislation was withdrawn)
14

again, and finally adopted in 1991.60 By that time, HIV had killed 4,000 gay men in San
Francisco and had infected tens of thousands.61
At the time of its passage, domestic partnership legislation was not a new issue, but AIDS
helped determine what issues people would be politically involved in. More specifically,
according to Chambers, “AIDS seems to have affected both the timing of the legal activity and
the language and tactics of both proponents and opponents” of domestic partnerships and samesex marriage.62 Even some lesbians who were previously campaigning against legislation for the
validation of same sex relationships by the city changed their views. For example, Jean Harris,
who worked as a lesbian activist and was Harry Britt’s assistant in 1989, observed, “AIDS made
us realize that our lovers are our support systems. It made us more aware of the importance of
primary relationships. It made love and relationships even more important than they had seemed
before.”63
AIDS not only galvanized the effort to pass domestic partnership legislation within the
gay community, but also brought the realities of AIDS to the forefront of the city’s political
agenda. For example, there were significant efforts to persuade California lawmakers to
authorize more funds for AIDS research and treatment, and to end the push for legislation
requiring mandatory testing of persons believed likely to be infected.64 Additionally, with
government inaction, gay activists started a variety of grassroots organizations to assist people
infected with AIDS.65 Organizations like the San Francisco AIDS foundation and the AIDS
Project Los Angeles worked to mobilize thousands of gay volunteers to serve as “buddies” to
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cook meals for, and clean homes of AIDS patients, and intervene when doctors and other
medical professionals were afraid to touch or interact with those infected.66
Given the severity of the crisis, AIDS acted as a springboard to gay marriage for some.
However, there was still no consensus within the gay community on whether marriage should be
pursued, and if so how aggressively. The arguments for and against gay marriage within the gay
movement remained largely unchanged. Opponents still argued that enabling gays to marry
would make gay couples the same as heterosexuals and inevitably stigmatize homosexuals who
chose not to marry. Additionally, some activists worried that pursuing gay marriage was to
privilege the concerns of middle class gays and divert focus from interests of those less
privileged gays for whom marriage was possibly less relevant.67 Furthermore, outside of the gay
community, AIDS only strengthened some people’s negative view of homosexuals and
motivated their effort to deny gays validation of their relationships. For example, advertising
campaigns used to “encourage gay men to use condoms simply reminded some people not of
lives that might be saved but of conduct they considered immoral.”68 Furthermore, there was still
a sense of indifference nationally towards AIDS: President Reagan did not say the word “AIDS”
publicly until 1985 when his friend, actor Rock Hudson, was diagnosed, and he did not give a
speech on the issue until 1991 after 20,000 Americans had died from the disease.69
In response, pro-gay marriage activists argued that marriage was the centerpiece of
American society’s social structure and no other political issue would test the dedication of
heterosexuals to gay equality.70 Additionally, they argued that until gays had the same rights as
heterosexual couples, homosexuality would remain a second class status. Lastly, they argued that
66
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without the right to marry, same-sex couples would need funds to hire lawyers to gain protection,
and couples without the means to retain a lawyer would have difficulty securing their
relationship rights.71 Therefore, legalizing same-sex marriage would give all same-sex couples
the right to marry, not just well-off couples who could afford legal counsel.72 Ultimately, the
organizational push for same-sex marriage garnered more support and slowly progress began to
be made in the validation of same-sex relationships.
By the 1990s, the gay rights movement had made significant progress in the courts for the
gay rights agenda and most gay activists showed greater concern for securing equal rights in
employment, housing, and health care.73 By 1993, about twenty-five cities across the country,
including New York, Berkeley, West Hollywood, and Madison, had enacted domestic
partnership ordinances that entitled partners to health insurance, hospital visitation rights, leave
to take care of a sick partner, and other legal benefits.74 There were small enclaves, usually in
liberal urban areas, where gay activists achieved tangible results; however, most of America
remained opposed to gay rights. In all of these cities, however, the domestic partnership status
and the benefits it entailed only covered municipal employees of the city. Despite their
limitations, domestic partnerships started to get the attention of young gay individuals, who
tended to be more supportive of same-sex marriage than older generations.75 Simultaneously,
there was a societal change in the understanding of marriage to be more about a commitment to
another individual rather than procreation.76 This change helped support the campaign to allow
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same-sex couples to adopt children, which in turn made the denial of marriage rights much more
difficult to defend.77
Though these changes may seem like small steps to full equality for homosexuals in
America, they do show the strong relationship between gay rights activism and concrete legal
change. Activists did not wake up one day and decide they wanted to marry their partners; rather,
there was debate, often hotly contested, that for years split the movement between those wanting
to seek recognition of their relationships and those who did not. The issue was not black and
white and both sides recognized the value of the other’s argument. There were many societal,
political, and legal implications and considerations the movement needed to make in deciding to
move forward with pursuing same-sex marriage.
Starting in the 1990s, at least a few judges in states like Hawaii and Alaska were willing
to look seriously at the issue of same-sex marriage, despite the opposition of a majority of
Americans at the time.78 Though the first legalization did not take place until 1993 in Hawaii,79
during this time the social arguments and the constitutional arguments for and against same-sex
marriage, which will be discussed in chapter three, were articulated and have remained mostly
unchanged in the last two decades.
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CHAPTER II
Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence and the Road to Same-Sex Marriage
Justice Kennedy and Levels of Scrutiny
To fully understand the Obergefell v. Hodges decision, it is important to analyze the steps
the litigants took to achieve that result. While there were several cases that the Supreme Court
chose not to hear, of those granted certiorari, four most affected the Court’s answer to the samesex marriage question: Bowers v. Hardwick, Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas, and United
States v. Windsor.1 While Bowers was the first case heard by the Court and ultimately served a
major loss for the gay rights movement, the latter three set the stage for Obergefell and the
recognition of gay rights in America.
Other than affirming the rights of homosexuals, the three cases leading up to Obergefell
are also linked because they were all written by Justice Anthony Kennedy. Known as the swing
vote on the Court today, Kennedy’s opinions in Romer and Lawrence paved the way for his
reasoning in Windsor and Obergefell, particularly regarding his application of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to gay rights issues. Though only
Windsor dealt specifically with the issue of same-sex marriage, Romer and Lawrence also
provide a substantial rationale for Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell.
One point of controversy in Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence on gay rights, however, is
his eschewal of assigning the level of scrutiny the Court should apply when determining the
constitutionality of laws that single out homosexuals. Currently there are three levels of review,
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or scrutiny, the Court can use when considering a law that targets, or “classifies,” a specific
group of people: strict, heightened, or rational basis. Laws that classify based on race, national
origin, or religion (known as suspect classes)2 are subject to strict scrutiny, and are assumed to be
unconstitutional unless the state offers a very good reason for the classification.3 Laws that
classify according to gender (a semi-suspect class)4 are subject to heightened scrutiny and can be
upheld for some reasons (i.e. some physical characteristics in certain employment situations), but
not many. Laws that classify on age, social class, or other non-suspect classes are subject to the
rational basis test and only need a plausible reason to be upheld. While laws that undergo strict
or heightened scrutiny are rarely upheld as constitutional, laws subject to the rational basis test
are much more likely to pass the Court’s standard.
Determining the standard of review is important because the more rigorous the scrutiny,
the more difficult it is for the government to defend a law. Particularly in cases involving the
Fourteenth Amendment, the pre-determined standard nearly ensures that laws classifying people
based on race or gender, for example, are rarely upheld. While these classifications have proven
beneficial for racial minorities and women, homosexuals have never received the same level of
certainty from the Court. As the author of all four Supreme Court decisions over a nineteen-year
period that expanded and recognized homosexual rights, Justice Kennedy arguably had ample
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time and opportunity to determine what level of review laws targeting homosexuals should
receive, but chose not to do so.
Justice Kennedy: A Classic Pragmatist
Anthony McLeod Kennedy was born July 23, 1936 in Sacramento, California to Anthony
J. Kennedy, an attorney and lobbyist, and Gladys Kennedy, a teacher.5 Growing up, Kennedy
took an interest in politics and was a star student; he attended Stanford University and finished
his requirements in three years before spending his fourth year at the London School of
Economics.6 Kennedy then attended Harvard Law School, and after graduating in 1961 he
returned to his hometown to teach at McGeorge Law School and take over his father’s law firm.7
While practicing law and teaching, Kennedy also worked as a lobbyist for the Republican Party
in California and became an acquaintance of Edwin Meese, who would later become a top aide
to then Governor Ronald Reagan.
In 1975 Ronald Reagan recommended the President Gerald Ford appoint Kennedy to a
seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, who then nominated Kennedy for the
seat. At 38, Kennedy was the youngest federal appellate judge in the country. During his time on
the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy took a narrow case-by-case approach in his opinions and did not
appear to be influenced by ideological principles or rhetoric.8 Despite the ideological differences
between him and the other more progressive judges on the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy had a polite
demeanor that kept negotiations cordial when the Court was divided. During this time as the
Ninth Circuit’s minority leader, he earned a positive reputation amongst lawyers and judges.9
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While on the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy wrote an important gay rights opinion, Beller v.
Middendorf.10 The case dealt with the constitutionality of the U.S. Navy rule that prohibited
enlisted members from engaging in homosexual acts.11 While Kennedy’s opinion ultimately
upheld the Navy’s regulations as constitutional, his reasoning was quite significant given the
time and arguably it foreshadowed his later opinions on gay rights.
In his opinion, Kennedy stated that “the real stigma imposed by the Navy’s actions . . .is
the charge of homosexuality,” but because the plaintiffs did not charge that the Navy’s policies
discriminated against homosexuals, the court did not have to determine the regulation’s
constitutionality in that context.12 Additionally, regarding substantive due process,13 Kennedy
argued that the narrow question of the case did not require the court to determine whether
consensual private homosexual conduct was a fundamental right.14 In addition, since the
plaintiffs only argued that the regulations violated their fundamental right to privacy, and Beller
dealt narrowly with a Naval regulation prohibiting homosexual conduct, the equal protection
analysis was not required.15 In other words, had the plaintiffs argued that the regulations
discriminated against homosexuals, or if the case dealt with criminalization of private consensual
10
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homosexual conduct outside of the military, Kennedy suggested the court might have applied
equal protection analysis.
Therefore, Kennedy argued that there only had to be a rational reason for the Navy to bar
and discharge open homosexuals from the service, and the Navy’s reasons were sufficient.16
However, Kennedy noted that just because the court upheld the regulations as constitutional did
not mean the regulations were wise. On the contrary, the judgment did not indicate the court’s
view on the morality of the regulations since it was not within the power of the court to
determine.17
Kennedy’s opinion in Beller v. Middendorf is important for three reasons. First, it
demonstrated Kennedy’s tendency to write narrow opinions answering only the question at hand.
Second, it showed that Kennedy emphasized individual rights in his analysis. Finally, his focus
on discrimination laid the groundwork for his opinions regarding gay rights in the Supreme
Court. However, the case also presented a breakthrough because it was the first time a federal
appeals court suggested that government discrimination against gay people (outside the military)
might have to pass “heightened scrutiny” to be constitutional.18
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The Big Leagues: Justice Kennedy and the Supreme Court
On June 27, 1987, Justice Lewis Powell surprised Washington and the White House
when he announced his resignation from the U.S. Supreme Court after serving for 16 years.19
Despite Democratic warnings, President Reagan nominated Robert Bork a few days later to fill
the vacancy.20 After an arduous battle, the Senate finally voted on October 23, 1987 to block
Bork’s appointment 42-58.21
A few weeks later, President Reagan nominated Kennedy for the seat. Justice Kennedy’s
confirmation hearings began in December 1988, an election year, and in February he was
unanimously approved by the Senate 97-0 and sworn in.22 Much as he did on the Ninth Circuit,
Kennedy took a pragmatic approach to the cases heard by the Court. Though he voted with the
conservatives on the Court for the first few years, he rocked the boat in 1992 when he coauthored the opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.23 Then,
four years later, the Court voted to hear its first gay rights case since Bowers v. Hardwick.24
Roy Romer v. Richard G. Evans

19

Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech, "Lewis F. Powell Jr.," Oyez, accessed February 21, 2016,
https://www.oyez.org/justices/lewis_f_powell_jr.
20
Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Byrd Says Bork Nomination Would Face Senate Trouble," The New York Times (New
York, NY), June 30, 1987, accessed February 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/30/us/byrd-says-borknomination-would-face-senate-trouble.html. (Bork was unanimously known as a staunch conservative with a crass
personality and had been involved in the Watergate Scandals as Solicitor General).
21
Associated Press, "Senate's Roll-Call on the Bork Vote," The New York Times (New York, NY), October 24,
1987, accessed February 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/24/us/senate-s-roll-call-on-the-bork-vote.html.
22
Linda Greenhouse, "Washington Talk: Court Politics; Nursing the Wounds from the Bork Fight," The New York
Times (New York, NY), November 30, 1987, [Page #], accessed February 21, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/30/us/washington-talk-court-politics-nursing-the-wounds-from-the-borkfight.html.
23
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). (5-to-4 decision, reaffirming Roe v.
Wade).
24
(Interestingly, Justice Powell, whom Kennedy replaced, voted to uphold the Georgia laws criminalizing
homosexual conduct and later admitted he regretted the decision). See Michael J. Rosenfeld, The Age of
Independence: Interracial Unions, Same-sex Unions, and the Changing American Family (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2007), 165.
24

In 1992 the state of Colorado placed a constitutional amendment on the ballot for a
referendum vote. Known as Amendment 2, it sought to remove all anti-discrimination
protections for homosexuals in the state that currently existed, and barred them from being
reinstated in the future:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments nor any of its agencies,
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt, or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual
orientation, conduct or practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution
shall be in all respects self-executing.25
Almost immediately after voters approved Amendment 2, plaintiffs filed suit hoping they
could stop it from ever taking effect. A district court judge issued a temporary order barring
Amendment 2 from becoming part of the state constitution, arguing that the government needed
a compelling interest to implement it.26 In response, the state Attorney General appealed to the
Colorado Supreme Court, which upheld the district court’s preliminary injunction, though on
different grounds.27 In the 6-1 opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled:
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution protects the fundamental
right to participate equally in the political process, and that any legislation or state
constitutional amendment which infringes on this right by ‘fencing out’ an
independently identifiable class of persons must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.28
After this ruling, the case went back to the district court, where the state had to prove
Amendment 2 was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.29 The district court
found that Amendment 2 was not narrowly tailored to serve any interest the state provided. The
25
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Colorado Supreme Court then looked at the case again and found there was no compelling
interest advanced by Amendment 2 and it was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 The Colorado court’s ruling “marked the first time that
the highest court of any state had found it unconstitutional to deny certain rights to
homosexuals.”31
The defendants32 in the case then appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Court granted certiorari, scheduling oral arguments for October 10, 1995.33 While counsel for the
respondents was somewhat confident given the lower court rulings, counsel Jean Dubofsky was
also aware the Supreme Court had not taken a case regarding homosexual rights since Bowers v.
Hardwick, and the Court had yet to rule positively on a case regarding homosexual rights.
Their worries about the case’s outcome soon abated. Less than one minute into
Colorado’s presentation at oral argument, Justice Kennedy asked the Colorado Solicitor General
if he could cite any precedent where the Court upheld a law like Amendment 2, which Kennedy
described as making a classification “for its own sake.”34 Kennedy then rejected the Solicitor
General’s answer and stated “here, the classification is adopted to fence out. . .the class for all
purposes, and I’ve never seen a statute like that.”35 Following Kennedy’s lead, Justices Stevens,
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter attacked the state’s argument. Even Justice O’Connor, who had
voted in the majority in Bowers, questioned whether the language of the Amendment meant that
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“a public library could refuse to allow books to be borrowed by homosexuals, and there would
be no relief from that”36 While the Solicitor General argued it did not, O’Connor pressed further
and asked, “well, how do we know that?”37
By the time the Solicitor General’s thirty minute argument was over, counsel and
plaintiffs for Evans were confident they had at least a 6-3 majority on their side. When Dubofsky
stood to present her argument,38 she spent much of her allotted time answering “that is correct”
from the six justices. Even when Justice Scalia tried to imply that Amendment 2 served to
prohibit “special provisions giving special protections” for those with “homosexual orientation,”
Dubofsky reminded him that the anti-discrimination laws banned discrimination on sexual
orientation, and since all people have a sexual orientation, the laws Amendment 2 sought to
repeal protected everyone, not just homosexuals.39
The oral argument for Romer v. Evans marked a distinctive shift in the gay rights
movement in the eyes of the judiciary. As Murdoch and Price put it in Courting Justice:
Never before had the U.S. Supreme Court justices talked publicly about gay people as
ordinary folks who check out library books, eat in restaurants, hold jobs and might need
police protection or kidney dialysis. Never before had a majority of justices hammered
away at a blatant attempt to discriminate against gay people. Never before had a majority
sounded so ready to wrap gay and bisexual Americans in the Constitution’s protection.40
When it came time to decide who was going to write the majority opinion, serendipity
might have played a role. Because Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the minority in Romer, the
most senior member of the winning side, in this case Justice Stevens, got to choose the author of
36
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the majority opinion. Though it is hard to say exactly why Stevens chose Kennedy to write the
opinion, the testimony of some clerks on the Court that term is that Stevens chose Kennedy to
keep O’Connor in the majority.41 Regardless of why Kennedy was elected to write the opinion,
he did, and on May 20, 1996, the Court announced in a 6-3 decision that Amendment 2 violated
the Equal Protection Clause.
In Romer v. Evans, Justice Kennedy focused on two main ideas to determine that
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional. First, that Amendment 2 had an inexplicably large sweep by
both repealing all existing anti-discrimination legislation and barring more protections from ever
being adopted in the future. Second, he wrote that there was no rational reason, other than
animus, for a law to make it more difficult for one group of citizens to seek protections from the
government:42
We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A
state cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the
Equal Protection Clause, and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Colorado is
confirmed.43
Kennedy argued that even if the amendment was narrowly construed, it made Colorado’s
gay and bisexual community totally vulnerable to irrational and arbitrary discrimination that
Colorado law otherwise protects against.44 Kennedy wrote that the amendment demands that
homosexuals be put in a “solitary class” and withdraws “from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement
of these laws and policies.”45
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Additionally, Kennedy rejected the state’s argument that Amendment 2 was intended to
conserve resources to fight discrimination against suspect classes, because Amendment 2 did not
say anything about other non-suspect classes protected under Colorado law.46 On the contrary,
Kennedy noted:
[T]he Amendment imposes a special disability upon [homosexuals] alone. Homosexuals
are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint. . . We find
nothing special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken
for granted by most people either because they already have them or do not need them;
these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions
and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.47
Second, Kennedy acknowledged that while all laws classify persons for certain reasons,
and those classifications may disadvantage a group, the classification can be upheld “so long as it
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”48 Kennedy further argued Amendment 2 had no
rational relation to a government interest because it not only imposed a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, but also because the scope of the amendment
could leave no explanation except animus for the class that it affected.49 Kennedy wrote that
“Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.”50
While it is notable that Kennedy argued that Amendment 2 could not pass even the
lowest level of scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, he simultaneously rejected the
Colorado Supreme Court’s reasoning that Amendment 2 should be subject to strict scrutiny. In
other words, Kennedy’s opinion focused more on the negative effects and unconstitutionality of
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Amendment 2 than on the level of scrutiny or majority rights.51 While it is unclear exactly why
Kennedy chose not to determine the level of scrutiny for laws that classify based on sexual
orientation, scholars have offered some possible reasons.
As one brief submitted to the Court in Romer argued, the Supreme Court did not have to
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny for laws classifying homosexuals because
Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause on its face and could not even pass rational
basis.52 Therefore, the Court may have found it unnecessary to get bogged down in levels of
scrutiny. Additionally, Kennedy may have been less likely to garner a majority if he had insisted
upon heightened or strict equal protection scrutiny in Romer because a lower court had rejected
the plaintiffs’ arguments that sexual orientation was a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.53
Furthermore, because challengers to Amendment 2 did not appeal that specific part of the lower
court ruling, the Supreme Court did not have a reason to rule on it.54
Another possible reason why Kennedy eschewed determining the level of scrutiny for
sexual orientation could be the case-by-case approach that Kennedy employed throughout his
time on the Ninth Circuit. The question in Romer the Court had to answer was whether
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, and Kennedy answered it
without making a sweeping decision on scrutiny that would have protected gays more fully under
the law. Just as the Supreme Court’s landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision
simply answered the separate-but-equal question and did not address voting rights or bans on
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interracial marriage, Kennedy’s opinion did not address gay rights issues not directly raised in
Amendment 2.55 Nevertheless, as Murdoch and Price argue:
[T]he Court broke with its own antigay past to declare that hatred is not a legitimate
reason to treat gay Americans as second class citizens. Measuring Amendment 2 against
the minimal requirement that it bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest,
Kennedy found that it simply did not make sense -- except as an expression of “animus”
or animosity.56
Perhaps most importantly, with the Romer opinion Kennedy fulfilled the promise implicit in his
1980 Beller ruling that gay constitutional claims had to be taken seriously and that laws created
for no other purpose than to discriminate cannot stand under any standard of review.57
On the other hand, the ruling also gave little or no guidance to lower courts on how to
proceed with cases regarding homosexual rights that did not deal specifically with antidiscrimination laws. In other words, it was difficult to determine how much “equal protection”
gay Americans had won because even though six justices “had drawn a line and scolded
Colorado for having crossed it. . .they gave no reliable hint of what else -- if anything -- they
would view as over the line.”58 Furthermore, while the Supreme Court ruled that gay Americans
were not “strangers to the law,” and had rights under the Equal Protection Clause, the opinion
and reasoning gave no indication that other laws that classified gays, such as bans on them
serving in the military or bans on same sex sodomy, were unconstitutional as well.59 Because the
Court did not provide a sweeping ruling that stated that any law which classified according to
sexual orientation was subject to strict or heightened scrutiny, litigants would need to challenge
each issue involving such classifications one by one. In other words, “[g]iven no guidance, most
lower court judges [chose] the weak ‘rational basis’ standard that most always [meant]
55

Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians, 478.
Ibid., 476
57
Ibid., 467
58
Ibid., 481
59
Ibid., 482
56

31

discrimination [won].”60 For example, though Romer stated that homosexuals could not remain
“strangers to the laws,” gay soldiers were persecuted and discharged from the military until
2011, when Don’t Ask Don’t Tell was repealed because -- for fifteen years after Romer -barring open homosexuals from serving in the military was understood to be rationally related to
serve a legitimate state interest.
Between Romer v. Evans and 2003 the Court refused to hear several cases on gay
rights,61 but ruled on some cases that involved homosexuality in broader contexts.62 Perhaps the
most interesting development during this time, however, was the change in the Court’s rhetoric
about homosexuals generally. During this time the Court started to become more comfortable
with discussing homosexuals as human beings.63 The cases that the justices turned away,
however, revealed the contradictory ways the outside world was responding to gay demands for
full equality.64 While the Court had said that homosexuals could not be strangers to America’s
laws in Romer, many judges used the Bowers v. Hardwick sodomy decision as a homophobic
60
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weapon.65 Perhaps the Court was waiting to take a case that was worth hearing; it turned out to
be Lawrence v. Texas, and once again, Kennedy was given an opportunity to give equal rights to
gays.

Lawrence et al v. Texas
In Lawrence, the Court decided that all laws criminalizing sodomy were unconstitutional
under the Due Process Clause. Though every state in America had laws banning sodomy at one
point, by the time the Court ruled in 2003, only 11 states still had them in place.66 In Texas
specifically, the state had passed a sodomy law in 1859 and it applied to heterosexual and
homosexual sodomy alike.67 In 1970 a federal judge in the state declared that the state sodomy
law was unconstitutional as applied to married couples.68 During this time Texas also liberalized
many of the state’s sex laws for heterosexuals by decriminalizing adultery, fornication,
seduction, and even bestiality.69 However, despite these progressive rulings, homosexuals were
still considered second-class citizens whose actions could be criminalized. In fact, in 1973, Texas
tightened its sodomy law to criminalize “deviate sexual intercourse” and a “Homosexual
Conduct” provision of the law made deviate sexual conduct a crime only if performed “with
another individual of the same sex.”70 While it is unclear how often the law was enforced,71 it
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took three decades for a challenge to the law to be successful and the law to be declared
unconstitutional.
***
On September 17, 1998, a Houston police officer responded to a reported weapons
disturbance at a private residence. Upon arrival at the residence, the officer found John Lawrence
and Tyron Garner engaging in a sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were then arrested and charged
with violating Texas Penal Code Ann. 21.06(a) which read: “[a] person commits an offense if he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”72 Lawrence and
Garner pleaded no contest and were each charged $125 and then appealed the decision to the
Harris County Criminal Court.73 The lawyers for Lawrence and Garner argued the law violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it only prohibited sodomy against same-sex couples and not
heterosexual couples.74 Additionally, counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the law violated the
plaintiffs’ right to privacy and contended that Bowers v. Hardwick was wrongly decided.75 The
judge in Harris County rejected the arguments and charged Lawrence and Garner $200 each.76
Counsel for the defendants then appealed the decision to a three-judge panel77 of the
Texas Court of Appeals, which declared that the Texas law was unconstitutional under the 1972
Equal Rights Amendment to the Texas Constitution.78 The judge found the law “inexplicable on
any rational ground of public policy” and concluded that there was no legitimate justification to
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target only gay people.79 However, the panel’s decision was reversed by the entire court of
appeals which upheld the constitutionality of the law 7-2, rejecting both the equal protection and
due process arguments.80 Attorneys for Lawrence and Garner appealed to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, and after their request was denied, filed a petition for certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court on July 16, 2002. In December of that year their petition was granted.81
As with Romer, we do not know why the justices voted to hear the case, or why, once
again, Justice Kennedy was chosen to write the majority opinion. On June 26, 2003, the Court
announced in a 6-3 decision that the Texas law was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment. According to Michael J. Rosenfeld:
The basis of the Lawrence decision (consistent with Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe and
Loving) was that the individual right to privacy was more important than community
standards, more important than popular opinion, and more important than the original
intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution.82
Furthermore, in his opinion Kennedy focused more on the implicit right to privacy
established in Griswold than on scrutiny and equal protection.83 He highlighted three main
points: (1) that homosexuals had a protected liberty interest to engage in private, sexual activity;
(2) that homosexuals’ moral and sexual choices were entitled to constitutional protection under
the Due Process Clause; (3) and that moral disapproval did not provide a legitimate justification
for Texas to criminalize homosexual sodomy. Regarding the first point, Kennedy noted there
was substantial precedent outlining “[the] broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty
under the Due Process Clause.”84 Moreover, he argued that the Court in Bowers had approached
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the case incorrectly by focusing on determining if there was a right to engage in certain
homosexual conduct, and by doing so, the Court belittled the liberty interest at stake.85
Furthermore, Kennedy asserted:
When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.86
Regarding the second point, Kennedy explained why the statute is invalid under the Due
Process Clause and not the Equal Protection Clause:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected
by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on
the latter point advances both interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law
which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain
even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When homosexual
conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in it of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and private
spheres. The central holding in Bowers has been brought into question by this case and it
should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual
persons.87
In other words, while Kennedy acknowledged that counsel for Lawrence and some briefs
argued the statute should be struck on equal protection grounds similarly to Romer, he refused to
do so given that the law upheld in Bowers treated homosexuals and heterosexuals equally, and
therefore could not be overturned using the equal protection grounds he employed in Romer.
More specifically, Kennedy wrote:
[W]ere we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the
conduct both between same sex and different sex participants.88
instruction from public teachers only.”) cited in Lawrence regarding the broad reach of liberty; Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): (The Court reasoned there was a protected interest in the right to privacy and
placed emphasis on the marital bedroom); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, (1972): (The Court determined that
there was a right to make certain decisions about sexual conduct outside the marital relationship, and unmarried
couples or and single people have rights to sexual privacy too just like married people.)
85
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
86
Ibid.,
87
Ibid., at 575
88
Ibid., at 575
36

In looking at the case through due process, therefore, Kennedy declared that laws banning
anyone from making independent decisions about their sex lives are unconstitutional, and that
reasoning goes beyond what an equal protection argument could.
Regarding the third point, concerning moral disapproval, Kennedy conceded that the
Bowers court sought to establish that homosexual conduct, which had been condemned for a
long time, was immoral. However, Kennedy noted that “this Court’s obligation is to define the
liberty of all, not to mandate its own moral code,”89 and the issue before the Court therefore was
“whether the majority can use the Power of the state to enforce these views on the whole society
through operations of the criminal law.”90 Kennedy argued that the state was prohibited from
doing so under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which protects the liberty
of all persons under the law, writing that “liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”91 In making
autonomous choices about their sexual conduct, Kennedy argued, homosexuals assert their
liberty right, and the ruling in Bowers denied homosexuals this right. Therefore, it could not
stand.
Furthermore, Kennedy explicitly stated that the reasoning used in Stevens’ dissent in
Bowers was correct in stating that moral disapproval of a group or practice is insufficient to
uphold a law targeting a group or banning a practice.92 Kennedy further asserted that “Bowers
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”93 In his 18-page opinion, he
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struck down all sodomy laws in America and deemed any state control of sexual conduct, for
heterosexuals and homosexuals alike, unconstitutional.
While there is much to celebrate in his decision in Lawrence, as in Romer, Kennedy
avoided determining the level of scrutiny the Court should use when confronted with laws
classifying on the basis of sexual orientation. As mentioned, Kennedy’s stated reason for not
deciding the case on equal protection grounds is because he wanted to overrule Bowers and
thought deciding Lawrence on equal protection grounds made it impossible to do so. That said,
some scholars contend that Kennedy could have used the reasoning in Loving to apply the due
process clause to overrule Bowers and then apply the equal protection clause to declare that
sexual orientation was a suspect or semi-suspect classification.94 Alternatively, Kennedy could
have overruled Bowers using the reasoning in Loving, that bans on interracial marriage were
unconstitutional even if whites and blacks were punished equally, because the “equal
application” of a criminal statute did not mean it was valid under the Equal Protection Clause.95
Therefore, Kennedy could have argued that simply because the statute upheld in Bowers
exemplified “equal application” of a criminal statute to all people, not just homosexuals, the
Court’s opinion was strictly framed in terms of the absence of a right to engage in homosexual
sodomy, not sodomy generally.
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While Kennedy arguably missed another prime opportunity to protect homosexuals more
broadly from discrimination, the decision did provide precedent for later cases. Most notably,
almost immediately after Lawrence v. Texas was decided, the American press and public went
into a frenzy about what the ruling could possibly mean for same-sex marriage. As one scholar
noted, “[p]rint media, television journalists, and online commentators all seemed to converge
around the assumption reflected in the Los Angeles Times headline: ‘Ruling Seen as Precursor to
Same-Sex Marriages.’”96 While Justice Kennedy’s opinion never mentioned same-sex marriage
in Lawrence, and, on the contrary, attempted to distance the Lawrence ruling from same-sex
marriage,97 Justice Scalia’s scathing dissent called direct attention to it.98 In the world outside the
courthouse, Ontario’s legalization of same-sex marriage in early June 2003,99 and the
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s pending decision on same-sex marriage in the state,100 almost
immediately linked Lawrence and same-sex marriage for many on both sides of the argument.101
Potentially reacting to the fear that America was moving too quickly in the direction of
full equality for gays, overall support for same-sex marriage declined among all ideological
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groups in the period of time immediately after Lawrence.102 However, as Kennedy stated in
Lawrence:
[T]imes can bind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its certain principles in their own search for
greater freedom.103
While Kennedy understood that in 2003 only heterosexual marriage could be permitted, he also
understood that with time, some laws might be challenged in order to promote greater freedom
for all. Kennedy was given that opportunity to invoke newfound principles to search for greater
freedom for homosexuals a decade later in United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v.
Perry.104
United States v. Windsor
Unlike both Romer and Lawrence, United States v. Windsor was the only case the
Supreme Court heard leading up to Obergefell that dealt with a federal law and homosexuals.
The case directly addressed Section 3 of the federal 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),105
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which defined ‘marriage’ as a union between a man and a woman, and ‘spouse’ as someone of
the opposite sex.106 Under DOMA, same-sex couples could not receive federal benefits of any
kind even if their marriage was legal in the state where they lived. Under DOMA, only marriage
between a man and a woman would receive social security survivorship benefits, immigration
rights, and the privilege of filing joint tax returns.107
***
In 2007 New York residents Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were married in Ontario,
Canada after living together for forty-four years.108 At the time, New York did not allow samesex marriage; however, Windsor and Spyer were able to live in New York as a married couple
because the state fully recognized same-sex marriages that were legally performed elsewhere.109
In 2009 Thea Spyer passed away and left her entire estate to Windsor. When Windsor attempted
to claim the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses, she was prohibited from doing so
under §3 of DOMA and had to pay $363,053 in estate taxes. She then sought a refund from the
IRS but was denied. Windsor filed a federal lawsuit and argued that DOMA violated equal
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protection principles in the Fifth Amendment made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Using rational basis review, the district court found §3 unconstitutional
and ordered the U.S. Treasury Department to refund Windsor’s tax with interest.110 The United
States111 appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district
court’s ruling.112 The United States then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari December 7, 2012.
Oral argument for United States v. Windsor was held on March 27, 2013. Solicitor
General Donald Verrilli for the United States made three main arguments about the interests
DOMA furthered: DOMA induces couples to marry and have children within marriage; DOMA
encourages uniformity in the administration of federal benefits; and DOMA saves the federal
government money.113 Additionally, counsel for the United States argued that states were
traditionally able to decide their marriage laws; marriage was traditionally understood as a union
between a man and a woman; and the Court should be cautious in declaring DOMA
unconstitutional.114 In contrast, Windsor’s brief contended that while the Court should apply
heightened scrutiny to DOMA because it discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, even
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under the rational basis test DOMA was unconstitutional.115 Counsel argued the law could not
withstand the lowest level of scrutiny because it targeted an unpopular group, imposed sweeping
disabilities without factual context, and was outside of America’s “constitutional tradition.”116
On June 26, 2013, ten years to the day after Lawrence v. Texas, the Court announced in a
5-4 decision that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional. In his majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy focused on the history of state regulation of marriage, the purpose of DOMA, and the
equal dignity and liberty interest of same-sex couples protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Kennedy asserted that states have always defined and regulated their own marriage laws, and
while these laws must respect the constitutional rights of citizens, states had the power to create
the laws.117 Furthermore, while Kennedy acknowledged that states are able to pass and enforce
their marriage laws, within the confines of an individual state, marriage laws must be applied
equally to all married couples. In other words, because New York had the right to legalize samesex marriage, the federal government had to make marriage benefits accessible to same-sex
couples in New York and all other states that legalized same-sex marriage.118 Furthermore,
Kennedy argued that while the federal government could regulate the meaning of marriage to
further a federal policy, like establishing income based criteria for social security benefits,
DOMA was applicable to “over 1,000 federal statutes and [a] whole realm of federal
regulations”119 that broadly affected citizens’ everyday lives.
Kennedy also argued that the 11 states and the District of Columbia that had legalized
same-sex marriage before Windsor had given same-sex couples who seek to marry “a dignity and
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status of immense report,” but that DOMA sought to strip them of that dignity.120 Quite bluntly,
he asserted that while New York sought to give protection and dignity to same-sex marriages and
same-sex couples, DOMA’s aim was to injure same-sex couples and “impose a disadvantage, a
separate status, and so a stigma upon all those who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful
by the unquestioned authority of the states.”121 And he goes on to say:
As the title and dynamics of the bill indicate, its purpose is to discourage enactment of
state same-sex marriage laws and to restrict the freedom and choice of couples married
under these laws if they are enacted. . . The Act’s demonstrated purpose is to ensure that
if any state decides to recognize same-sex marriage, those unions will be treated as
second class marriages for the purposes of federal law.122
In terms of the constitutionality of DOMA, Kennedy asserted that DOMA denied samesex couples the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Kennedy
further argued that DOMA “writes inequality into the entire United States code” by identifying a
subset of state-sanctioned marriages and declaring them unequal to heterosexual marriages and
unworthy of federal recognition.123 Kennedy asserted that DOMA had several negative
consequences including the humiliation of the “tens of thousands of children now being raised by
same-sex couples,” who, because of the law, could not “understand the integrity and closeness of
their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily
lives.”124 He concluded by stating that “the federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the state, by its
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”125
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For all the eloquent language on behalf of gays and lesbians in Windsor, Kennedy’s
opinion, as in Romer and Lawrence, did not determine that sexual orientation was a suspect or
semi-suspect classification. Moreover in contrast to Romer and Lawrence, it avoided addressing
equal protection in terms of scrutiny or a law’s relationship to a state interest at all. While
Kennedy arguably rejected DOMA on its face for putting same-sex couples in a solitary class
below heterosexual couples, his opinion was not explicit in language or reasoning to that end. On
the contrary, he discussed the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the
right to intimate association in terms of a right to privacy he discussed in Lawrence. For the first
time, he based his reasoning on the idea that DOMA violates same-sex couples’ right to equal
dignity.
While Kennedy’s failure to specify a level of scrutiny for sexual orientation
classifications in Romer and Lawrence may have been reasonable, in Windsor it is much harder
to defend. Unlike in Romer and Lawrence, there were no procedural hurdles in Windsor that
stood in the Court’s way to determine a level of scrutiny. Nevertheless, Kennedy “issued a
murky opinion” to declare DOMA unconstitutional.126 As SCOTUSblog’s William Duncan
wrote, not only did Kennedy not touch on the level of judicial review, but “the test that was
applied [in Windsor] appeared to be notably indistinct.”127 Others argued that formulating a test
for determining whether a statute interferes with the “equal dignity” is nearly impossible, if not
equivocal.128
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Windsor, like Romer and Lawrence, could reflect Justice Kennedy’s desire to look at the
issue narrowly and not give any guidance to lower courts for other gay rights issues. Arguably he
did not need to address the level of scrutiny because he believed DOMA was unconstitutional
whether strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, or the rational basis test was used. Another
possibility is that Kennedy and the rest of the majority in Windsor knew that the arguments to
apply a higher level of scrutiny were compelling and if they chose to determine the level in
Windsor, it would have effectively ended the entire marriage debate nationwide.129 Windsor was
also a case involving a federal law with very broad implications for a whole range of issues.
However disappointing it may be that Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Romer, Lawrence,
and Windsor, did not secure broader protections of equality for homosexuals in America by
determining a level of review for future gay rights cases, his opinions opened the door for
acceptance and equal treatment of gays in America. While Kennedy sits right of center on some
issues, his jurisprudence is notably progressive when it comes to some minority rights and
individual freedom. Perhaps this can be attributed to the time he spent abroad as a student where
he was exposed to more socially liberal views of his peers in the legal field. Perhaps it was that a
close family friend during his childhood and legal mentor was gay. Perhaps it was the
understanding that as time goes on, American law must adapt to invoke new principles and
freedoms that were not considered before.
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CHAPTER III
Obergefell v. Hodges and a Call for Heightened Scrutiny
Living in a Post-Windsor World
While United States v. Windsor did not give lower courts a clear decision on the level of
scrutiny for cases regarding classifications on sexual orientation, soon after the decision was
announced, state legislatures and courts began overturning same-sex marriage bans across the
country. Between June 2013 and November 2014, twenty-two states changed their marriage laws
to legalize same-sex marriage and to recognize same-sex marriages that were performed
elsewhere.1 Despite these gains, however, fifteen states did not change their marriage laws after
Windsor and same-sex couples in those states were still denied recognition of their relationships
and all the benefits married couples receive.2

Figure 1. States Where Same-Sex Marriage was Legalized Between Windsor and November 2014. Blue
Indicates States Where Same-Sex Marriage was Legal Before Windsor.
1

California, New Jersey, Hawaii, Illinois, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Colorado, Indiana,
Oklahoma, Utah, Wisconsin, Kansas, Nevada, West Virginia, North Carolina, Alaska, Idaho, Arizona, Wyoming,
South Carolina, Montana. See table 1 in the appendix for more information on individual states.
2
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. See table 1 in the appendix for more detailed information.
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While lawsuits in nearly all fifteen states that kept their laws on the books were filed,
only cases in four of those states were consolidated into one case in the Sixth Circuit and
renamed Obergefell v. Hodges.3 Specifically, Obergefell was the combination of six cases from
Tennessee,4 Michigan,5 Kentucky,6 and Ohio7 involving thirty plaintiffs.8 The plaintiffs had each
filed federal suits arguing that laws in their respective states violated the Fourteenth Amendment

3

Tanco v. Haslam, Governor of Tennessee, No. 14-571; DeBoer v. Snyder, Governor of Michigan, No. 14-571;
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4
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Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Tanco v. Haslam, Governor of Tennessee, No. 3:13-cv-01159 (Oct. 21, 13);
Preliminary Injunction, Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-cv-01159 (March 14, 2014).
5
The case DeBoer v. Snyder was brought in Michigan district court on January 2012 by one couple challenging the
state’s adoption law that prevented both parties from legally adopting their children because they were unmarried.
The state moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of standing; Judge Bernard A. Friedman, a Reagan appointee, agreed
the plaintiffs did not have standing in the adoption case, but encouraged the plaintiffs to re-file their case to
challenge the same-sex marriage ban instead. The plaintiffs did so and the court ruled in their favor on March 21,
2014. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing DeBoer R. 151 at 3); and Amended
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, DeBoer v. Snyder, ED Mi No. 12-10285 (Sep. 7, 2012).
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couples brought suit challenging the state’s recognition ban. On February 12, 2014, Judge John Heyburn II, a
George H.W. Bush appointee, ruled that the denial of recognition for valid same-sex marriages violated the Equal
Protection Clause and ordered the state to start recognizing marriages March 21. After that ruling, two couples in
Love v. Beshear requested the court also grant injunction for the same-sex marriage bans in the state. Heyburn
denied the request arguing that the couples should go through the standard procedure. On July 1, 2014 Judge
Heyburn then overturned the Kentucky’s same-sex marriage bans in Love v. Beshear using rational basis. See
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 397, 398 (6th Cir. 2014) and Memorandum Opinion, Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13cv-750-H (Feb, 12, 2014); Brett Barrouquere, "Federal Judge Weighing Challenge to Kentucky Gay Marriage Ban,"
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by denying them the right to marry, or prohibiting recognition of their marriages that were
lawfully performed in another state.9 Each district court ruled in the petitioner’s favor, but the
states appealed the decisions to the Sixth Circuit,10 which consolidated the cases and then
reversed on November 6, 2014.11 On November 17, 2014 the plaintiffs appealed the case to the
Supreme Court, and on January 16, 2015 the Supreme Court granted certiorari for Obergefell v.
Hodges, scheduling oral argument for April 28, 2015.12
***
There were two broad constitutional arguments in favor of same-sex marriage: marriage
is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, and excluding homosexuals from marriage,
or denying them recognition of their legal marriage performed elsewhere violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Regarding the Due Process Clause argument, proponents reasoned that
marriage is a fundamental right and the government could only limit such a right for compelling
reasons. Proponents argued that while the state has compelling reasons to place age restrictions
on marriage and prevent close relatives from marrying, the immutable sexual orientation of two
individuals was not a compelling reason to bar them from marrying. Proponents also often cited
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State Recognize Same-sex Marriages," LGBTQ Nation, last modified March 4, 2014, accessed March 8, 2016,
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the Supreme Court’s decisions in Loving v. Virginia,13 Zablocki v. Redhail,14 and Turner v.
Safley,15 all of which invalidated restrictions on the fundamental right to marry. Just as the
restrictions in these cases were deemed unconstitutional by the Court, proponents of same-sex
marriage argued marriage should not be limited to opposite sex couples.16
Same-sex marriage supporters also argued laws preventing same-sex couples from
marrying constituted discrimination based on sexual orientation.17 Furthermore, they claimed
that because homosexuals share many characteristics the Court considers relevant when
extending higher levels of scrutiny for classifications of race and gender -- namely the
immutability of the characteristic, a history of past discrimination, and a relative lack of political
power -- the laws should be subject to a higher level of judicial scrutiny.18 Regarding the Equal
Protection Clause, same-sex marriage supporters also argued that laws restricting marriage to
opposite sex couples constituted sex discrimination in the same way that laws restricting
marriage to mixed race couples constituted racial discrimination.19
In contrast, opponents of same-sex marriage denied that the fundamental right to marry
included a right to marry someone of the same sex.20 Moreover, they also noted that the Court’s
fundamental rights jurisprudence looks to tradition to define the scope of such rights, and for
thousands of years marriage was limited to opposite-sex couples.21 They also noted that
government restrictions on marriage -- such as setting minimum age requirements and forbidding
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marriage between close family members -- are commonplace and accepted as constitutional.22 In
response to the equal protection argument, gay marriage opponents denied that laws restricting
marriage to opposite sex couples constituted sex classifications because the laws treated men and
women alike, and therefore such laws did not nurture sexism in the same way that bans on
interracial marriage maintained white supremacy.23 While arguments of both sides in Obergefell
addressed each of these points, the specific facts of the case and the jurisprudence of the Court
determined how the issue was framed for each side.
Counsel for Obergefell and the Call for Heightened Scrutiny
Obergefell v. Hodges was unprecedented in many ways. It broke the record for the most
briefs ever submitted to the Court -- 148 briefs, 80 for the petitioners and 68 for the
respondents.24 While many of the briefs provided important arguments for the case, 41 of the 80
briefs written supporting the petitioners discussed scrutiny in their argument. Two briefs urged
the Court to definitively determine the level of scrutiny for sexual orientation, and 22 asked the
Court to apply heightened scrutiny because sexual orientation was a quasi-suspect
classification.25 Arguably the petitioner’s own brief gave the most compelling argument for the
Court to be explicit about the standard of review, arguing that the recognition bans were
22
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unconstitutional under Windsor; Ohio’s refusal to recognize existing marriages of same-sex
couples was subject to heightened scrutiny under the Due Process Clause; Ohio’s recognition
bans triggered heightened Equal Protection scrutiny because they discriminated based on sexual
orientation and sex; and Ohio’s recognition bans failed any standard of review.26
Regarding the first point, the brief claimed that, like DOMA, Ohio’s recognition bans
have the “design, purpose, and effect” of imposing inequality.27 Moreover, because the
recognition bans target the same narrow class of persons that DOMA did, and were designed to
make the marriages of same-sex couples unequal, they should be struck down on the same
grounds.28 Additionally, the recognition bans in Ohio have the practical effect of imposing a
stigma on same-sex couples in the state, as DOMA did at the federal level, and therefore are
unconstitutional.29 Furthermore, the brief argued that while Windsor struck a federal recognition
ban on same-sex marriages, the Windsor principles apply to the states as well because the ruling
“confirmed that federalism interests do not free states to trammel the constitutional marriage
rights of the individual.”30 Finally, the brief asserted that Ohio’s recognition bans infringe on the
sovereignty of other states that have legalized same-sex marriage.31
Regarding the second point, the brief argued that the recognition bans were subject to
heightened scrutiny under the Due Process Clause either because they infringed on the
fundamental right to marry, or because there was a protected liberty interest stemming from the
importance of marriage in society.32 It asserted that Loving made clear that couples have a

26

Brief for Petitioner at 20, 32, 38, 49, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). While the brief just mentions
Ohio, it is understood that since the cases from the three other states were consolidated with this one that the
arguments are the same and Counsel for Obergefell is writing on behalf of all the plaintiffs.
27
Ibid., at 21
28
Ibid., at 21 and 30
29
Ibid., at 24
30
Ibid., at 30-31
31
Ibid., at 31
32
Ibid., at 32
52

fundamental right to protection and recognition of their validly entered marriages.33 In Loving,
the Court held that Virginia’s interracial marriage bans, criminalization of out-of-state marriages,
and voiding marriages performed elsewhere “deprive[d] the Lovings of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”34
Therefore, petitioners in Obergefell also had a protected liberty interest for the legal respect of
their existing marriages.35 Perhaps most importantly regarding their Due Process Clause
argument, counsel asserted:
As Loving illustrates, the fundamental rights of marriage protected by due process are
not limited to receiving marriage licenses. The freedom to select the spouse of one’s
choice receives constitutional protection precisely because of the expectation that this
will be the single person with whom one will travel through life, sharing profound
intimacy and mutual support through life’s good times and bad.36
Regarding the third point, counsel argued that the recognition bans triggered heightened
equal protection scrutiny because they discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation and sex.37
Counsel asserted that the Court’s decisions in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor implicitly rejected
the notion that “government discrimination based on sexual orientation can be presumed
legitimate and constitutional,” even though the Court did so without explicitly determining the
standard of review for sexual orientation.38 Therefore, the brief gave several reasons for why the
Court should make explicit a standard of review to use for laws that classify on the basis of
sexual orientation.39 First, determining the level of review is necessary to affirm the equal dignity

33

Ibid., at 33-34. (“Loving not only struck down Virginia’s laws prohibiting interracial marriages within the state,
but also its statutes denying recognition and criminally punishing such marriages entered outside the state.” See
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4, 12 (1967)).
34
Ibid., 34 citing U.S. 388 at 12. Emphasis added
35
Ibid., 35
36
Ibid., 34
37
Ibid., 38
38
Ibid.,
39
Ibid., 38
53

of gay people because using only rational basis review brands homosexuals as inferior.40 Not
determining the level of review “tells gay people, their families, and everyone with whom they
interact that laws infringing on their personhood should be viewed with no more skepticism than
laws regulating packaged milk.”41
Second, the brief argued that determining the standard of review was appropriate because
homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination; sexual orientation does not bear any
relation to the class’ ability to contribute to society; sexual orientation is immutable; and
homosexuals as a class do not have sufficient political power to protect themselves from the
majority.42 Counsel also argued that the Court should apply heightened scrutiny to Ohio’s
recognition bans for discriminating on the basis of sex because they restrict the rights of both
men and women as individuals based on their sex.43 In other words, the recognition bans
discriminated against Jim Obergefell for being male instead of female, and the opposite was true
for the lesbian plaintiffs in the case.
Lastly, counsel argued that even if the Court did not determine the bans and all
classifications on sexual orientation warranted heightened scrutiny, the bans could not be upheld
even under the rational basis test because they do not bear a rational relationship to an
independent and legitimate end.44 In other words, respondent’s arguments do not “provide an
independent and legitimate end in itself for the infringement of the rights of same-sex couples
and their families;” rather they describe how same-sex couples and their families came to have
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their rights infringed.45 None of the state’s arguments provided an independent basis for
maintaining the discriminatory practice of banning same-sex marriage.46 Additionally, the state’s
argument indicated that marriage is merely a “government-run incentive program that channels
heterosexuals toward responsible procreation,” and completely demeaned married couples -especially childless couples -- to say that marriage was simply for procreation.47
While this thesis focuses primarily on the call for scrutiny of the petitioners in the case,
the arguments made by the respondents are important as well. In their brief, the respondents
made five main arguments for the constitutionality of the same-sex marriage bans and the
recognition bans. First, Windsor left marriage recognition to the states because it only involved
federal recognition of same-sex marriage and state, not federal, recognition is guaranteed in the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.48 Second, the same-sex marriage bans or the
recognition bans do not stem from animus because the state was able to offer other explanations
other than prejudice.49 In other words, the government did not depart from traditional practices
and did not target a group for novel burdens.50 Third, heightened scrutiny did not apply because
Ohio’s recognition ban did not reference sexual orientation and traditional marriage was not
understood to discriminate against same-sex couples.51 Fourth, Ohio’s recognition ban was a
reasonable response to those who wanted to evade the same-sex marriage ban by traveling to
another state. Finally, counsel also argued that Ohio’s recognition laws did not discriminate
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along suspect lines because they treated each gender equally, and traditional marriage, unlike
interracial marriage bans, was not designed to demean any particular sex.52
On June 26, 2015, twelve years to the day after Lawrence v. Texas and two years to the
day after United States v. Windsor, the Court announced in a 5-4 decision that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires states to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and, by
default, to recognize a same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. Immediately following the
decision there were celebrations, and same-sex weddings, all over the country. The White House
was illuminated with rainbow colors and gay and lesbian couples in America were finally and
fully able to make a legal commitment to each other. However, as wonderful as “Marriage
Equality Day” was for America and homosexuals, the opinion itself in Obergefell left many
questions, and calls, unanswered.
Call Denied: Kennedy’s Opinion in Obergefell
Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion made four main points: marriage has always been
important; marriage has evolved over time; there is a constitutional right to marry that applies
with equal force to same-sex couples; and the right to marry is fundamental. Regarding the first
two points, Kennedy acknowledged the importance of marriage: “[s]ince the dawn of history,
marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together.”53
Historically, he noted, marriage was understood as a union between a man and a woman, yet the
institution “has not stood in isolation from developments in law and society.”54 Even marriage
confined to opposite sex couples has evolved and this evolution has involved “not mere
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superficial changes. Rather, it has worked deep transformations, affecting aspects of marriage
long viewed by many as essential.”55 Moreover, Kennedy argued:
These news insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage. Indeed,
changed understandings of marriage are characteristics of a Nation where new
dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations, often through perspectives
that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and judicial
process.56
Therefore, while Kennedy acknowledged that respondents, and many “reasonable and
sincere people,” contend that marriage by its nature is a “gender-differentiated union,” same-sex
couples seeking to enter into marriage are not trying to devalue the institution.57 Rather, samesex couples’ desire to enter into marriage reflects their deep respect for the institution of
marriage.58 Moreover, because of their “immutable nature,” same-sex marriage is the only option
for homosexuals who wish to marry.59 Additionally, because of the discrimination gays and
lesbians have faced in the past, the questions about the rights of homosexuals only became part
of the legal discourse in the late twentieth century.60 Therefore, even though the Court was only
considering opposite sex couples when it described the right to marry in precedent cases, and
previously “made assumptions defined by the world and time of which it is part,” given current
understandings of homosexuals as human beings, it is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to license same-sex marriages.61
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Regarding the third point, Kennedy argued that the established constitutional right to
marry has long been protected under the Due Process Clause. Therefore since cases like Loving,
Zablocki, and Turner all dealt with opposite sex couples, the Court must consider why marriage
has been protected, and if those reasons apply to same-sex couples. Kennedy asserted there are
four principles that determine why marriage is protected by the Constitution: personal choice;
marriage supports a two-person union unlike any other; marriage is good for children; and
marriage is a cornerstone of society.62
Regarding the first principle of personal choice, Kennedy argued “the right to personal
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy,” and decisions
concerning marriage and other life choices like contraception, procreation, family relations, and
child bearing are some of the most intimate choices an individual can make.63 Choices like these,
Kennedy argued, shape one’s destiny and the nature of marriage allows two people to make
these decisions and find new “freedoms” of spirituality and intimacy together.64 Furthermore,
Kennedy argued “this is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation,” and there is
“dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry in their autonomy to
make such profound choices.”65 The second principle is that marriage supports a two-person
union so unique and important to the two persons involved:
Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no
one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that
while both still live, there will be someone to care for the other.66
The third principle is that marriage “safeguards children and families” in a unique way
and leads to a better understanding of rights like childbearing, procreation, and education.67
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Kennedy noted that the Court has acknowledged marriage’s connection to other rights and has
held that all of the varied rights unified as a whole are central to the protected liberty interest of
the Due Process Clause.68 Moreover, while marriage provides material benefits to children,
marriage also provides other profound benefits such as understanding the integrity and closeness
of their family and its concord with their community; affording permanency and stability; and
offering loving and nurturing homes.69 This idea is supported by the fact, Kennedy asserted, that
most states allow gays and lesbians to adopt children and there is agreement -- between
petitioners, respondents, and the law -- that same-sex couples provide loving and supportive
homes to children, whether biological or adopted.70 Therefore:
[E]xcluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of the
right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer
the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no
fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue
here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.71
However, he also noted that childbearing is only one of the many aspects of the constitutional
right to marry, and that right is not diluted or less meaningful for couples who do not or cannot
have children.72
Finally, Kennedy argued marriage is protected under the constitution because the Court
and the Nation have made it clear that marriage is a cornerstone of our society. Even as marriage
has changed and evolved over time, marriage has remained “a building block of our national
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community.”73 Therefore, marriage is not just a relationship between the couple that vows to
support one another, but with that vow, society also pledges to support the couple, “offering
symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.”74 Furthermore
while the benefits for married couples vary from state to state, all states make marriage the
cornerstone for “expanding governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities.”75 Therefore, “by
virtue of their exclusion from that institution, same-sex couples are denied the constellation of
benefits that the States have linked to marriage” and are treated as second class citizens.76
In outlining the four reasons why the Constitution protects marriage, Kennedy then
asserted that the principles apply to same-sex couples just as they do opposite sex couples and
excluding same-sex couples from marriage harms same-sex couples “in more than just material
burdens.”77 More specifically:
Same-sex couples are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would
deem intolerable in their own lives. As the State itself makes marriage all the more
precious by the significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of
teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and
lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.
Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek
fulfillment in its highest meaning.78
Therefore, because limiting marriage to opposite sex couples is inconsistent with the
central meaning of the fundamental right to marry, there must be a recognition that laws
“excluding same-sex couples from their right to marry imposes a stigma and injury of the kind
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prohibited” by the Constitution.79 Kennedy dismissed respondent’s argument that legalizing
same-sex marriage would create a new right as “inconsistent with the approach the Court has
used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.”80
Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial marriage,’ Turner did not ask about a
‘right of inmates to marry,’ and Zablocki did not ask about a ‘right of fathers with unpaid
child support duties to marry.’ Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in its
comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the
relevant class from the right. . .[Furthermore], if rights were defined by who exercised
them in the past, then received practices could serve as their own continued
justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied. This Court has rejected
this approach, both respect to the right to marry and the rights of gays and lesbians.81
In other words, just because something has always been one way, does not make it
constitutional. The fact that many people believe same-sex marriage is wrong makes no
difference:
[W]hen that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the
necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that
soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied. Under the
Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex
couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them
this right.82
In terms of the constitutionality of the same-sex marriage bans, Kennedy asserted the
laws denied same-sex couples the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause.
Kennedy argued that the two clauses are connected and their liberty and equal protection
concepts lead to stronger understanding of the other.83 This idea of intertwining the Equal
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause were used in Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence, and he
then solidified that relationship between the two in Obergefell. Moreover, he noted that Loving
79
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declared bans on interracial marriage invalid because of unequal treatment of interracial couples,
and because the bans were “so subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process
of law.”84 Kennedy then asserted that cases like Loving and Zablocki reveal how “new insights
and and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental
institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”85 In other words, as society changes,
so do the norms that are protected under the Equal Protection Clause, and while same-sex
marriage was not always recognized as needing equal protection, it is now.86 Kennedy wrote:
It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it
must be further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality. Here the
marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are
denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a
fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships,
this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm.
The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate
them. . .These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not
be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may
exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied them.87
Kennedy therefore reasons that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional not because
they violate the Equal Protection Clause and treat same-sex couples differently than opposite sex
couples simply because of their sexual orientation, but because there is a fundamental right to
marry for all people inherent in the Due Process Clause.
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Finally, Kennedy addressed the most substantial arguments of the respondents. He
dismissed their request for the Court to wait until there had been a sufficient democratic
discourse on same-sex marriage by noting that there “have been referenda, legislative debates,
and grassroots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and
scholarly writings. There has been extensive litigation in state and federal courts,” as well as 148
briefs submitted pointing that substantial attention has been given to the question of same-sex
marriage.88 Additionally, while the democratic process should be used for change in most
circumstances, the Constitution says that process is appropriate “so long as that process does not
abridge fundamental rights.”89 Clearly, the democratic process regarding same-sex marriage has
been used to deny and abridge same-sex couples their fundamental right to marry, so it is
appropriate for the Court to rule in this case. Furthermore, it makes no difference where the issue
of same-sex marriage is in the democratic process, but rather what matters is that the
Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry. Moreover, the Court should be
wary of leaving issues of fundamental rights to the democratic process because, as in Bowers, the
Court did so and caused gays and lesbians “pain and humiliation.”90 Moreover, even though
Bowers was overruled in Lawrence, “the substantial effects of these injuries no doubt lingered
long after Bowers was overruled” because “[d]ignitary wounds cannot always be healed with the
stroke of a pen.”91 Finally, Kennedy warns of the effects if the Court were to uphold the Sixth
Circuit’s decision:
Were the Court to uphold the challenged laws as constitutional, it would teach the Nation
that these laws are in accord with our society’s most basic compact. Were the Court to
stay its hand to allow slower, case-by-case determination of the required availability of
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specific public benefits to same-sex couples, it still would deny gays and lesbians many
rights and responsibilities intertwined with marriage.92
Kennedy also rejected the claim that the institution of marriage would be harmed if samesex marriage was legalized. While respondents argued that allowing same-sex marriage would
lead to fewer opposite sex marriages because same-sex marriage would sever “the connection
between natural procreation and marriage,” Kennedy simply replied that “it is unrealistic to
conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not to marry simply because same-sex
couples may do so.”93
***
Though the decision as a whole is much to be celebrated as a step in the right direction
for equality in America, Justice Kennedy’s opinion, below the surface, is strikingly unclear for
gay rights in a broader context. As in his previous opinions, Kennedy chose not to determine the
standard of review for sexual orientation. He refused to determine a clear standard even though
he wrote about the history of discrimination against homosexuals; referenced the immutability of
sexual orientation; and the minority status of homosexuals. Even though the briefs for petitioners
and twenty-two friends of the Court called for the Court to explicitly determine the level of
scrutiny for classifications on the basis of sexual orientation, Kennedy all but ignored their call.94
Moreover, although he asserted that marriage is a fundamental right, he did not follow the
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established reasoning that the Court uses when looking at the abridgment of fundamental
rights.95
Instead, Kennedy focused on the intertwined nature of the Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause, the fundamental right to marry, and the evolution and expansion of what the
Constitution directs. Regarding the first point, several scholars have written at length about what
Obergefell achieved. In the words of Laurence Tribe -- arguably one of the most well respected
constitutional law scholars:
[T]hat Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly wound the double
helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity -- and to have
located that doctrine in a tradition of constitutional interpretation as an exercise of public
education. Equal dignity, a concept with a robust doctrinal pedigree, does not simply look
back to purposeful past subordination, but rather lays the groundwork for an ongoing
dialogue about fundamental rights and the meaning of equality.96
In doing so, however, Kennedy departed from other cases regarding the fundamental
right to marry and did not apply the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause in the same
way. For example, “Loving generally treated the liberty and equality claims as parallel rather
than intertwined,” whereas Obergefell viewed them as connected.97 Regarding the second point
about fundamental rights, Kennedy’s emphasis on that point was not surprising. As Tribe notes:
The idea that all individuals are deserving in equal measure of personal autonomy and
freedom to “define their own concept of existence” instead of having their identity and
social role defined by the state -- has animated Kennedy’s most memorable decisions
about the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution, from Planned Parenthood v.
Casey to Parents Involved in Schools v. Seattle.98
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In fact, Kennedy even hinted during the oral argument for Obergefell that he was inclined
to focus more on the fundamental right to marry than the guarantee of equal protection for
homosexuals in America. At the very end of the Solicitor General’s argument in support of the
petitioners in the case, Kennedy asked him how a precedent case Washington v. Glucksberg
required the Court to define fundamental rights in a narrow way. Solicitor General Verrilli
answered:
We do recognize that there's a profound connection between liberty and equality, but the
United States has advanced only an equal protection argument. We haven't made the
fundamental rights argument under Glucksberg. . .And therefore, I'm not sure it would be
appropriate for me not having briefed it to comment on that.99
Kennedy followed up asking if Verrilli could explain why the United States did not make a
fundamental rights argument. Verrilli answered:
[T]his issue really sounds in equal protection, as we understand it, because the question is
equal participation in a State-conferred status and institution. . .[and] what the
Respondents are ultimately saying to the Court is that with respect to marriage, they are
not ready yet. And yes, gay and lesbian couples can live openly in society, and yes, they
can raise children. Yes, they can participate fully as members of their community.
Marriage, though, not yet. Leave that to be worked out later. . .But what these gay and
lesbian couples are doing is laying claim to the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment
now. And it is emphatically the duty of this Court, in this case, as it was in Lawrence, to
decide what the Fourteenth Amendment requires. And what I would suggest is that in a
world in which gay and lesbian couples live openly as our neighbors, they raise their
children side by side with the rest of us, they contribute fully as members of the
community, that it is simply untenable -- untenable to suggest that they can be denied the
right of equal participation in an institution of marriage, or that they can be required to
wait until the majority decides that it is ready to treat gay and lesbian people as equals.
Gay and lesbian people are equal. They deserve the equal protection of the laws, and they
deserve it now. Thank you.100
Finally, Kennedy’s opinion also spoke to the evolution of equality and how
understandings of equal treatment may change over time. Tribe addresses this point as well:
[A] too rarely noted aspect of Justice Kennedy’s opinions in this realm, beginning in
Romer and Lawrence and culminating in Obergefell, is the belief that the Constitution is
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written and designed to shed light on society’s evolving experience, framing windows
through which to view and asses that experience, and to thereby educate us in how we
might proceed to form an ever more perfect union.101
Kenji Yoshino, a Constitutional Law Professor at New York University, also notes
Kennedy’s understanding of the evolution of equality and how it is rooted in the Constitution:
[T]he problem of the blindness of each generation, the modesty of the framers in
recognizing this blindness, their use of abstraction as a way to bequeath the question of
liberty to future generations, and the attendant responsibility of constitutional interpreters
in each generation to take up that legacy.102
For all its eloquence, Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion left homosexuals with more
questions than answers in areas other than marriage. Legal scholars and interest groups on both
sides of the debate attacked Kennedy’s opinion for its lack of clarity and transparency. Among
those who applauded the outcome of the decision, there were many who denounced Kennedy for
once again ruling in favor of gay rights without determining the standard of review. Opponents
of the outcome inside and outside the Supreme Court attacked Kennedy for pulling his reasoning
and arguments out of thin air. They argued the concept of liberty and dignity as they applied to
homosexual rights were created by Kennedy and not based in the Constitution.
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CHAPTER IV
Criticisms of Kennedy’s Opinion: In Outcome and Reasoning
If you are among the many Americans -- of whatever sexual orientation -- who favor
expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the
achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of
commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate
the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it. -Chief Justice Roberts, Obergefell v.
Hodges Dissent.
The Dissenters on the Court
Since the Obergefell v. Hodges decision was announced, there has been much debate and
discussion regarding Kennedy’s opinion. While some groups and legal scholars praise the
decision for both the reasoning Kennedy used and the outcome, most have criticized the
reasoning, the outcome, or both.
Perhaps the most vocal adversaries of the reasoning and outcome of the decision are the
four dissenting Justices on the Court. The dissenting Justices and their supporters argue that the
Obergefell opinion exemplified judicial activism, created a new right, misinterpreted the
meaning of liberty, reverted to an unprincipled expansive take on fundamental rights and due
process used in Lochner v. New York,315 and ignored the Court’s traditional equal protection
analysis. The Justices also raise concerns about the potential implications of the opinion on
religious liberty and polygamy. While their claims hold some value, the main point of each of
them was to provide a basis, other than discrimination or animus, to prevent homosexuals from
accessing their fundamental right to marry. This section evaluates and analyzes the arguments
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made by the Justices, focusing mainly on the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, who
wrote the most extensive and, in some ways, critical dissent.
One common theme in the Obergefell dissents is the discussion of how the decision robs
the American people and the state legislatures of the opportunity to resolve the issue of same-sex
marriage.316 Each of the dissenting Justices claimed that the Court’s decision in Obergefell was a
blatant example of judicial activism, and that “commitment to democracy renders the Court’s
intervention in the marriage wars fundamentally illegitimate.”317 This argument is not surprising
because Justices on both sides of the ideological aisle often accuse their colleagues of engaging
in judicial activism when writing about decisions with which they disagree.
On the surface, the dissenting Justices’ claims hold clout, particularly given that Justice
Kennedy stressed the importance of states having the power to determine their own marriage
laws to invalidate DOMA in Windsor. However, Kennedy wrote in his opinion that sometimes
the Court has to remove certain topics from the will of democratic majorities in order to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the Courts.318 Additionally, as Laurence Tribe writes,
Kennedy reminds his critics that, “for all its presumptive virtues, democracy has its limits,” and
people do not have to wait for legislative action to assert a fundamental right.319 Tribe also
argues that the structures of federalism protect individual rights, and in his past decisions Justice
Kennedy
[H]as made it clear that he views the sovereignty of the states as important much less as
an end in itself than as a means to the end of protecting the liberties of those who reside
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in those states -- both their negative liberties from oppressive regulation and their positive
liberties to take part in politically accountable self government.320
In other words, Kennedy believes states have sovereignty not just for the sake of the
separation of powers, but because sovereign states are a means by which individuals living in
those states have their liberties protected. Tribe further argues that for Kennedy “the
Constitution’s implicit division of powers between the national government and the States exists
principally to protect personal liberty and equality.”321 Consequently, Justice Kennedy’s
proposition in Obergefell, “is thus fully consistent with the more fundamental demand that no
level of government exercise its power in a manner that, however rooted in tradition, ends up
depriving individuals of those rights.”322
Tribe further argues that this fundamental demand was made clear in “both public
dialogue and lower court decisions in the wake of Windsor” as states began to see that they were
depriving individuals of liberty and equality rights by prohibiting same-sex marriage.323
Therefore, in writing Obergefell Kennedy did not need to root his analysis in federalism the way
he did in Windsor because he recognized that the courts and the people had determined no level
of government can take away the liberty and equality of homosexuals.324
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts further argued that the Court should have practiced
“judicial restraint” and not decided Obergefell because proponents of same-sex marriage lost the
“opportunity to win the true acceptance that comes from persuading their fellow citizens of the
justice of their cause.”325 In other words, Roberts asserted that the Court’s decision will result in
resentment of opponents of same-sex marriage because “[s]tealing this issue from the people will
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for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a dramatic social change that much more
difficult to accept.”326
While Roberts is correct in stating that the ruling would make people upset,327 to argue
that is a reason to let the states continue to deny same-sex couples their fundamental rights is
misguided.328 For example, in the short term after Brown v. Board of Education (1954), racial
progress in the South was delayed and “radicalized, southern racial politics” allowed for the
advancement of the careers of extreme segregationists like Bull Connor and George Wallace.329
However, those possible implications were not a justification for the Supreme Court to step away
from the case and decide that individual states could determine whether they wanted to integrate
schools or not. As there was after Brown, and slightly less so after Loving, there has been and
will continue to be backlash regarding the Obergefell ruling. However, all three cases determined
that the Constitution demands full equality under the law and, implicit in Obergefell, the Court
determined denying same-sex couples anything but marriage equal to that of opposite sex
couples constituted the “separate but equal” doctrine overruled in Brown. Today, Brown and
Loving are regarded as some of the best decisions the Supreme Court has ever produced, and
both were decided independently of the negative consequences they would have on the South or
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White Supremacy. Therefore, while the “we should wait and see” argument is not surprising, it
does not make a convincing case for the denial of a fundamental right.
The second argument that the dissenting Justices make is that in its decision, the Court
created a “new right” that was neither rooted in Court precedent or the Constitution. While
Kennedy asserted that same-sex marriage is part of the fundamental right to marry in its
comprehensive sense, Roberts argues the “fundamental right to marry does not include the right
to make a State change its definition of marriage,”330 and “[n]either the petitioners nor the
majority cites a single case or other legal source providing any basis for such a constitutional
right. None exists, and that is enough to foreclose their claim.”331 Therefore, he frames it in a
way that supports the idea that the legislatures, not the Court, should decide who can access the
fundamental right to marry. Justice Alito, also argues that the Court “created” a new right, and
argues “[t]he Constitution says nothing about a right to same-sex marriage.”332
While framing a question in a certain way can determine the answer, Roberts and Alito
misconstrued the petitioners’ argument. Petitioners were not claiming they had a right to force
the states to change their marriage laws, but that they had a right, as citizens protected under the
law, to access their fundamental right to marry just like opposite sex couples. However, even if,
as Roberts argues, petitioners were seeking a right to make the states change their definitions, the
Court’s precedent supports that. In Loving, the Court forced the states with interracial marriage
bans to change their definitions of marriage to include unions between interracial couples.
Previously, Virginia and fifteen other states defined marriage as a union between a man and a
woman of the same race. For the states that had to change their laws as a result of Loving, the
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institution of marriage was changed significantly, and was even threatened as an institution.333
Previously, those in support of the interracial marriage bans argued that marriage would be
ruined if interracial couples were allowed to marry, that the human race would suffer if mixed
race couples were able to reproduce,334 and that interracial marriage was against biblical
teaching.335
Roberts distinguishes other precedent marriage cases by insisting that none of the laws at
issue in Loving, Zablocki, or Turner tried to change the ‘core’ definition of marriage as a union
between a man and a woman.336 He distinguishes Loving and Obergefell specifically, arguing
that forcing the legalization of interracial marriage did not change the “core” institution of
marriage any more than integrating schools changed schools after Brown.337 While integrating
schools in Brown did not change the physicality of schools, for some their educational
experience was completely changed by the Brown decision.338 As mentioned above, there was
significant backlash, including backlash in the name of religion, from the Brown decision even
though schools, as physical places where children are educated, did not change.339
Furthermore, Loving and Obergefell had less of an impact on marriage than Brown did on
schools. Marriages between people of the same race before and after Loving were not affected by
333
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the decision at all. Similarly, opposite sex marriages before and after Obergefell will not be, and
have not been, changed at all by the decision. In contrast, Brown affected black and white
children nationwide who were previously in segregated schools. In fact, Brown reconfigured
social relations throughout the South and states closed public schools rather than integrate
them.340 In other words, opening marriage to interracial couples and same-sex couples only
affects interracial couples and same-sex couples who decide to get married. The existing or
future marriages that do not fall within those categories are not affected in the same way that
white and black children were both affected by Brown.
Both Roberts and Alito support their claim that same-sex marriage is not included in the
fundamental right to marry by appealing to tradition, arguing that the traditional, or definitional,
understanding of marriage has always been linked to procreation. Justice Alito specifically
argues that, the Court’s “understanding of marriage, which focuses almost entirely on the
happiness of persons who choose to marry, is shared by many people today, but it is not the
traditional one,” and that tradition confirms that the fundamental right to marry only involves
opposite sex couples who have the potential to procreate.341 Roberts also argues that because
humans must procreate to survive, and children do better if their parents stay together, “sexual
relations that can lead to procreation should only occur between a man and a woman committed
to a lasting bond.”342
While it is true that historically people were married to have children or to cement
political alliances, to say that is the only reason people get married today threatens to insult all
the married couples who choose not to, or cannot, have children. Additionally, as Tribe notes:
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In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the history of marriage is manifestly
structured not just to respond in legal terms to the dissenters’ claims that the institution
has had a fixed meaning for millennia, but also to make ordinary people focus more
closely on how the evolution of gender roles, among many other developments, has
silently but assuredly transformed the institution’s meaning.343
Therefore, Kennedy argues that allowing same-sex couples to marry does not redefine
marriage. Additionally, excluding groups of people from accessing a fundamental right because
they have traditionally been excluded is not a good enough justification for the exclusion.344
While tradition is important in determining who has access to fundamental rights, it is not the
only, or most important factor. Furthermore, understanding that all fundamental rights evolve,
and the fundamental right to marry specifically has evolved, does not mean, as Justice Scalia
claims in his dissent, that every state violated the Constitution for 135 years between the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, and Massachusetts legalizing same-sex marriage in
2003.345 Nor does it mean that anyone who ever thought same-sex marriage was implausible,
wrong, or unnecessary is an ignorant bigot.346 Rather, as Tribe writes, Kennedy understands that:
[A] governmental practice that limits the options available to members of a
particular group need not have been deliberately designed to harm the excluded group if
its oppressive and unjustified effects have become clear in light of current experience and
understanding.347
In other words, whether the limiting practice is deliberate or not, what matters is that as
time goes on, those limits are reconsidered, and removed if necessary. That is why the Framers
included the Ninth Amendment, which states: “the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”348 The Framers
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understood, as Kennedy does, that as time goes on, human understanding of rights, equality, and
inclusivity change and those changes need to be accounted for.
Even though the dissenting Justices may detest this “evolution” of rights, it is not
unprecedented, and not something that Kennedy created out of thin air. For example, the right to
vote was once a right that only white, land owning males had access to.349 In 1870, the Fifteenth
Amendment gave former slaves the right to vote, and in 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment gave
women the right to vote.350 Therefore, to say that marriage, as a fundamental right, cannot be
expanded because, as a matter of history, it has always been understood in one way cannot be
supported with the development of other fundamental rights.
Though the fundamental right to marry differs from the fundamental right to vote in that
it was expanded by the Court, not Constitutional Amendments, it is not unprecedented for the
Supreme Court to expand or establish certain fundamental rights that are not explicitly included
in the Constitution.351 For example, the Court has recognized the right to direct the education and
upbringing of one’s children;352 the right to procreate;353 the right to bodily integrity;354 the right
to privacy from government intrusion;355 and the right to sexual intimacy:356
Thus the line of cases Justice Kennedy invokes conspicuously protects rights resting
not on any particular clause, like the Freedom of Speech Clause or the Free Exercise of
Religion Clause, but instead on the dignity and autonomy of the individual standing
349
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against the forces of coerced conformity -- on principles underlying the written
Constitution but nowhere expressly articulated in its text.357
Furthermore, while the Court is able to expand and establish rights over time, it has used
two approaches “for shaping the middle ground of calling for the creation of unenumerated rights
and avoiding making everything a right.”358 First, an open ended common law approach
associated with Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman359 and second, a more closed-ended formulaic
approach associated with the majority in Washington v. Glucksberg.360 As Yoshino notes:
Obergefell did not categorically resolve the ongoing conflict between the two models, but
it heavily favored Poe. . .Kennedy also made sure to say that the Glucksberg approach
“may have been appropriate” in certain contexts, but not in discussing fundamental rights
of marriage and intimacy. By doing that he presents marriage and intimacy as exemplary
rather than exhaustive instances of rights for which the Glucksberg methodology would
not obtain.361
The third point of criticism of Kennedy in the dissenting opinions is his invocation of the
rights to “liberty” and “dignity.” As Justice Thomas argues in his dissent, “[s]ince well before
1787, liberty has been understood as freedom from government action, not entitlement to
government benefits,” and since the petitioners have not suffered from government action, they
have not been deprived of liberty.362 Thomas further reasons that when reading the history of the
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Due Process Clause, “it is hard to see how the ‘liberty’ protected by the Clause could be
interpreted to include anything broader than freedom from physical restraint.”363 Justice Thomas,
like Roberts, frames the issue as petitioners trying to force their way into marriage, rather than
the state barring homosexuals from accessing a fundamental right simply because they are
homosexual.
For Thomas, the government banning same-sex couples from marrying, or banning the
recognition of their marriages, does not represent government abridgment. Rather, Thomas
contends that since the states allow same-sex couples to enter into relationships other than
marriage, engage in sexual intimacy, make vows in public ceremonies, and raise children without
issue, they have not been deprived of liberty.364 Additionally, he adds the states have not
prevented “petitioners from approximating a number of incidents of marriage through private
legal means, such as wills, trusts, and power of attorney,” and therefore have not deprived them
of liberty.365
However, the Obergefell plaintiffs from Michigan originally brought suit challenging the
state’s adoption law for that exact reason. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse were raising their
adopted children together, but because of Michigan’s adoption law, the children could only have
a legal relationship with one parent.366 Therefore, DeBoer was the legal adoptive parent of their
daughter Ryanne, and Rowse was the legal adoptive parent of their two sons Nolan and Jacob.367
Because of the adoption law, even if DeBoer wrote in her will that Rowse should have custody
of Ryanne, her decision had no legal status. Therefore, a judge could have awarded the child to
363
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someone else, and the surviving parent, who raised the child since birth, would effectively be a
legal stranger to the child.368 Therefore, while Thomas is correct in his assertion that the
plaintiffs were able to create wills, given that the wills held no legal status it is hard to argue that
DeBoer, Rowse and other same-sex couples in their position were not deprived of liberty. There
is no benefit to signing a legal document that offers no protection from government intrusion.
The fourth point of criticism of Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion is what the dissenting
Justices claim as his “unprincipled” due process analysis. In his dissent, Roberts notes that even
though the Solicitor General, who argued in support of the petitioners, “expressly disowned the
due process argument before the Court [in oral argument]. . .The majority nevertheless resolves
these cases for petitioners based almost entirely on the Due Process Clause.”369 He further
contends “the majority’s argument is that the Due Process Clause gives same-sex couples a
fundamental right to marry because it will be good for them and for society,” which is
“indefensible as a matter of constitutional law.”370 Roberts acknowledges that substantive due
process protects certain fundamental liberty interests “against state deprivation,” and these
fundamental liberty interests can only be abrogated if the state offers compelling justification.371
However, Roberts argues that there are limits to this approach and the Court should be wary of
holding laws unconstitutional because it finds them “unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought.”372
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Roberts claims that in its due process analysis and understanding of liberty, the Court
broke with precedent and returned to the unprincipled approach of Lochner.373 As mentioned
earlier in this chapter, the Court in Lochner determined that a New York law preventing bakers
from working more than ten hours a day violated the liberty of the bakers protected by the Due
Process Clause because bakers had the freedom of contract to bargain for themselves. While the
Court has since repudiated that decision, to say that Kennedy invoked the same reasoning in
Obergefell is incorrect. As Tribe argues, there is a significant difference between Lochner and
Obergefell, namely that no one at the time of Lochner argued that the ruling provided a way to
redress the economic subordination of bakers. In contrast, “the freedom to marry championed in
Obergefell was understood by all to directly redress the subordination of LGBT individuals.”374
The fifth criticism of Kennedy’s opinion is the absence of traditional equal protection
analysis. Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent asserts “[t]he majority does not seriously engage with
[the equal protection] claim. Its discussion is, quite frankly, difficult to follow,” and the main
point the opinion makes is that there is a synergy between the Equal Protection Clause and Due
Process Clause and other precedents relying on one clause have relied on the other.375 Perhaps
most notably, however, Roberts writes:
Absent from this portion of the opinion, however, is anything resembling our usual
framework for deciding equal protection cases. It is case book doctrine that the “modern
Supreme Court’s treatment of equal protection claims has used a means-ends
methodology in which judges ask whether the classification the government is using is
sufficiently related to the goals it is pursuing.”376. . .The majority goes on to assert in
conclusionary fashion that the Equal Protection Clause provides an alternative basis for
its holding. Yet the majority fails to provide even a single sentence explaining how the
Equal Protection Clause supplies independent weight for its position, nor does it attempt
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to justify its gratuitous violation of the canon against unnecessarily resolving
constitutional questions.377
While Yoshino in particular argues the absence of equal protection is intentional, he also
argues it was ultimately better for same-sex couples because “the synergy that [Kennedy]
discussed meant that equal protection analysis could inform substantive due process in such a
way that would perforce change the usual framework of analysis.”378 Yoshino further discusses
how Kennedy introduced this synergy in Lawrence, when he determined the case in terms of
substantive due process because the liberty analysis advanced both due process and equal
protection:379
[B]y engaging in the liberty analysis in Lawrence, Kennedy required the states to level
up to treat both straights and gays equally, which in that case meant the elimination of all
sodomy statutes. Put differently, the equality concerns implicated in that case were,
against intuition, better served under the Due Process Clause rather than under the Equal
Protection Clause. . .In Obergefell, a standard equal protection ruling would have
permitted the states either to level up by granting both same-sex couples and opposite
sex couples marriage licenses or to level down by refusing to grant licenses to both sets
of couples.380
Therefore, he argues Kennedy’s focus on due process “protects the true equality interests
of gays and lesbians more than an equal protection decision ever could,”381 because:
An individual could take the principled view that the state should not be in the business
of running recreational facilities. Yet even that individual should have qualms if the
reason a municipality closes a public pool is to avoid integrating it on racial lines.382
Similarly, an individual could hold the principled view that the state should be out of the
marriage business. Yet even that individual should have qualms if the reason for shutting
down civil marriage is the threat of the same-sex couples entering the institution.383
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While it is correct that individuals should have qualms if civil marriage is shut down due
to the threat of same-sex couples entering into the institution, that has not prevented some
individuals from refusing to provide marriage licenses, or state representatives from suggesting
the end to marriage all together.384 Therefore while in principle Yoshino’s argument is valid, in
reality, due process has proven to provide little protection to some same-sex couples seeking
marriage.
In addition to his argument about the absence of a traditional equal protection analysis,
Roberts does claim that even if Kennedy did include it, the laws in question did not violate the
clause, under rational basis, because they are rationally related to a “legitimate interest” in
“preserving the traditional institution of marriage.”385 Interestingly, he does allow that “the equal
protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused
challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits,” signaling that if a case is brought in the
future on equal protection grounds in which homosexuals are denied concrete benefits, then
those claims may raise constitutional questions.386
All of the dissenting Justices also discuss the decision’s broader implications. First,
Roberts, Alito, and Thomas raise concerns about the religious liberty of individuals who believe
that marriage is a union between a man and a women and homosexuality is a sin. In his dissent,
Chief Justice Roberts presents hypothetical examples such as a religious college that provides
married students housing but only to opposite sex couples, or a religious adoption agency that
declines placing children with same-sex couples.387 Justice Alito also argues that the decision
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will have a negative impact on religious liberty and goes as far to say it will be used to “vilify”
persons “unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy.”388 Additionally, he argues that analogizing
same-sex marriage bans to laws that denied equal treatment for African American and women is
dangerous and “will be exploited by those who are determined to stamp out every vestige of
dissent.”389 Perhaps most scathing, however is his assertion that “those who cling to old beliefs
will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those
views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments,
employers, and schools.”390
In addition to the arguments about the implications of the opinion on religious liberty,
Chief Justice Roberts also argues that the opinion in Obergefell may open the door for polygamy
because it makes it more difficult for the states to maintain their definition of marriage as a union
between two people.391 Roberts argues that if there is dignity in a same-sex couple using their
autonomy to make the profound choice to marry, then it is hard to argue there is less dignity in
the bond between three people who autonomously make the profound choice to marry.392
Roberts argues that since both same-sex marriage and plural marriage seek to alter the “core”
definition of marriage, there is no principled way to validate one but not the other. While there
are some proponents of polygamy, Den Otter for example, that argue Obergefell laid the
groundwork for plural marriage, same-sex marriage will not, and cannot lead directly to
polygamous marriages. Even if polygamists bring suit to legalize plural marriage after
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Obergefell, the likelihood of the bans being lifted is very slim because the state’s interest in
limiting the number of marriage partners is strong.393
The dissenting Justices and their supporters argue that the Obergefell opinion was an
example of judicial activism, created a new right, misinterpreted the meaning of liberty, reverted
to Lochner’s unprincipled due process analysis, and ignored the equal protection clause. As
shown in this chapter, the Justices framed the issue in Obergefell differently to arrive at a desired
result. Both Alito and Roberts deny the fundamental right to marry exists in a comprehensive
sense and justify that position by relying upon traditional definitions of marriage. As
demonstrated, rights evolve, and excluding a group for their innate sexuality, or because
marriage has always excluded them, are not compelling reasons to continue excluding them.
Additionally, despite Justice Thomas’ effort to explain that the government has not abridged the
liberty of same-sex couples, the plaintiffs from Michigan had no way to ensure their children
would not be considered legal strangers to their family.
While Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and Thomas all disagree in the reasoning and the outcome
of the Obergefell decision, Tribe and Yoshino both answer the questions of the dissents and
show how, particularly in terms of due process, the Obergefell opinion was principled and rooted
in precedent.394 Tribe and Yoshino argue it is both acceptable, preferable, and predictable that
Kennedy fused his due process and equal protection analyses instead of making distinct
arguments for equal protection and due process.
393
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CHAPTER V
Even those who emphatically agree with Justice Kennedy that the Constitution affords
same-sex couples the right to marry, many are quick to claim that his sweeping opinion
was heavy on rhetoric and light on legal reasoning -- a political masterstroke but a
doctrinal dud.1
Concurrences off the Court: With Outcome, Not Reasoning
Though there were no concurring opinions written by any of the Justices on the Court,
there have been a number of legal scholars and journalists who, while agreeing with the ultimate
outcome of the Obergefell decision, disagree with the reasoning Kennedy used to achieve that
end. While the arguments of these groups focus on a variety of implications of the opinion such
as tax reform,2 estate planning,3 and adoptions,4 the more important criticisms of the opinion
pertain to Kennedy’s failure to determine the standard of review for sexual orientation. The main
arguments of these critics are that the opinion avoided determining the standard by focusing too
narrowly on the fundamental right to marry and by fusing the Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause instead of providing a clear independent analysis of each. As Peter Nicolas
writes:
That lack of transparency both leaves the Court’s decision vulnerable to criticism and as
ipse dixit5. . .and denies litigants and lower courts the guidance they need to apply the
constitutional principle consistently in future cases.6 For this reason, Obergefell and its
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antecedents represent a somewhat unstable base upon which to build future gay rights
victories.7
Of course, Kennedy may have deliberately tied the Equal Protection Clause and Due
Process Clause tightly together, and avoided determining the standard of review for
classifications on sexual orientation. To properly evaluate and analyze the claims of those who
criticize him for doing so, it is necessary first to reconsider the arguments that help explain why
Justice Kennedy avoided determining the standard in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor, and then
why he did so again in Obergefell.
As discussed in chapter II, in Romer the Court potentially did not have to determine the
level of scrutiny because Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause on its face and
could not even pass the rational basis test. Additionally, the state trial court had rejected the
contention that sexual orientation was a semi-suspect or suspect classification and the petitioners
in Romer did not appeal that part of the ruling to the Supreme Court so it would have been
awkward for the Court to answer it.8 In Lawrence Kennedy stated in his opinion that he wanted
to overrule Bowers and thought that rooting his decision in the Equal Protection Clause made it
impossible to do so. Kennedy worried that using equal protection would mean sodomy bans
could be upheld if they were drawn to prohibit sodomy generally and did not single out
homosexual sodomy.9 That said, some scholars contend that Kennedy could have used the
reasoning in Loving to apply the Due Process Clause to overrule Bowers and then apply the
Equal Protection Clause to declare that sexual orientation was a suspect or semi-suspect
classification.10 Additionally, given the Court’s rejection of the equal application argument in
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Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 144.
Ibid., 138
9
Ibid., 139
10
Ibid., 139. (“Yet even if he felt compelled to address the due process claims and overrule Bowers, Justice
Kennedy could have also addressed the class-based equal protection claim by following the example of Loving v.
8

86

Loving, Kennedy could have used equal protection to determine the standard of review and
argued that a general sodomy ban was still invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the
bans treated same-sex couples and opposite sex couples equally.
In Windsor, Kennedy avoided addressing equal protection at all and stressed the right to
dignity implicit in the Due Process Clause. As in Romer, the Court possibly declined to
determine the standard of review in Windsor because on its face, DOMA was unconstitutional
and could not pass the rational basis test. Additionally, in Windsor if the Court had used
heightened or strict scrutiny, it would have effectively ended the entire marriage debate
nationwide and overturned same-sex marriage bans in 38 states. Another possible reason is that
Windsor also dealt with a federal law which had incredibly broad implications nationwide.
One potential reason why Kennedy may have focused so much on the fundamental right
to marry instead of classifying sexual orientation as a semi-suspect or suspect classification in
Obergefell is because Kennedy is deeply concerned about fundamental rights.11 Since Kennedy’s
time on the Ninth Circuit, his opinions have made clear that he values individual rights over
group based classifications. Another possible reason why Kennedy chose to focus on the
fundamental right to marry and not the classification of homosexuals is because the questions
asked in Obergefell dealt specifically with marriage. While it is true that the Supreme Court in
Obergefell was answering questions regarding whether the states could deny same-sex couples
marriage, that does not mean the Court was barred from using a class based approach to strike
down the marriage bans. On the contrary, in each of the cases that determined race and gender

Virginia. There the Court struck down miscegenation laws alternatively on the ground that they violated the
fundamental right to marry and the ground that they constituted class-based discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.”)
11
Ibid., 144 (“Kennedy might have a different view of the proper role of equal protection clause, preferring an
approach that is rights focused, rather than class focused and moving away from the rigid tiered approach in favor of
a more unitary approach.”)
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were suspect and semi-suspect classifications respectively, the Court determined the level of
scrutiny despite that not being part of the constitutional question they sought to answer directly.
Therefore, the Court could have focused on the fundamental right to marry and the class based
restriction of the marriage laws.
Another potential reason why Kennedy avoided focusing on the standard of review, is
because it would have been too broad of an approach. However, because the Court focused
narrowly on the fundamental right to marry, the Court now has to defend all of the government
restrictions on marriage. Although, as discussed in the last chapter, the Court will likely be able
to uphold the restrictions on plural marriage, that door may have not been opened at all if
Kennedy took a class based equal protection approach in Obergefell. A class based equal
protection decision would only apply to laws prohibiting marriage based on sexual orientation
and would hold that denying marriage to a group of people for their sexual orientation cannot
stand under the equal protection clause. Such a decision would not bring laws restricting
marriage on the basis of age, genealogy, and number into question.12
Lastly, Kennedy may have chosen not to provide independent equal protection analysis in
his opinion because he wanted to treat the constitutional guarantee of the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause as unified and thereby solidify the reasoning that he first used in
Lawrence emphasizing that the clauses reinforce each other. In other words, unlike in Loving
where the Court treated liberty and equality claims as parallel rather than intertwined, Obergefell
explicitly treated the two clauses as a double helix, such that: “each concept -- liberty and equal
protection -- leads to a stronger understanding of the other.”13 While Tribe and Yoshino argue
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Yoshino, "New Birth of Freedom?," 172.
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there are benefits to deciding the case on due process grounds, and lumping equal protection with
it, there are also potential problems.
For example, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Services14 the Court said that the
government did not have to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against the
invasion of private actors. The Court argued that the Due Process Clause limits the state’s power
to act, but it does not guarantee minimal levels of safety and security.15 While the facts of
DeShaney and Obergefell are very different, the due process principles are similar. The
Obergefell decision only protects homosexuals from government intrusion on their marriages,
not in any other respect. While same-sex couples can get married, there is no protection from
being fired from their jobs, or being discriminated against in housing, public accommodations,
and credit. Additionally, some private actors are still able to discriminate against people on the
basis of sexual orientation and, in many cases, legally deny gays and lesbians their “equal
dignity” in contexts outside marriage because there are no anti-discrimination laws to prevent
private actors from doing so.
Obergefell also arguably left gays and lesbians in a disadvantageous position in terms of
their ability to fight against discrimination that occurs in the name of religious liberty. Under
Obergefell, homosexuals who are discriminated against in the name of religion are only
supported by their right to “equal dignity,” or under state or local anti-discrimination laws.
However, since the federal government has no broad protections against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, and less than half of the states have such laws, only some
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498 U.S. 189 (1989). In that case, a toddler became comatose from severe head injuries received from an abusive
father over a long period of time. While Social Services took steps to protect the child after numerous complaints,
they did nothing to remove the child from the father’s custody. The child’s mother sued Social Services arguing the
Department had deprived the child of liberty to bodily integrity under due process and did not do enough to protect
the child from the father’s abuse.
15
Yoshino, "New Birth of Freedom?," 161.
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homosexuals, based on state and local laws, can file a lawsuit in court after facing
discrimination. Even then, because they are not a protected class, there is no guarantee that the
court will rule in their favor and that anti-discrimination laws serve a compelling government
interest.
Additionally, in the 28 states that do not have anti-discrimination laws, if homosexuals
are discriminated against in other contexts outside of marriage such as housing, credit, and public
accommodations, they will be out of luck. If they are discriminated against within the context of
marriage or denied the right to marry, as has happened since Obergefell, courts may have to
measure their claim to “equal dignity” against the First Amendment right to religious liberty. If
Kennedy determined the standard of review, a law that exempts government officials or other
persons from providing marriage licenses or other marriage related services, would have to prove
that the exemption serves a compelling interest. Furthermore, the government would have to
prove it serves a compelling interest that overrides the compelling interest of ridding society of
discrimination.
While the freedom of religion is a compelling interest, it is unclear whether it outweighs
the compelling interest of rooting out discrimination. Regardless, it is more difficult to prove it
outweighs the compelling interest of rooting out discrimination than it is to prove it outweighs
guaranteeing same-sex couples’ equal dignity. Therefore, declaring sexual orientation a semisuspect class would have protected homosexuals not only from government intrusion, but also at
least give them equal footing to counter private actors claiming they have a religious right be
exempt from serving same-sex couples or facilitating the “gay lifestyle.”
While Kennedy was able to justify not determining the standard of review in Romer,
Lawrence, and Windsor, the potential reasons for eschewing the issue in Obergefell are harder to
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defend. Even if Kennedy felt he needed to use the fundamental rights claim to overrule the
Court’s one line summary dismissal of Baker v. Nelson, he could have followed the Loving
example and declared the statutes unconstitutional on substantive due process fundamental rights
grounds, and class-based equal protection grounds.16 Again, as in Romer and Windsor, it is
possible that Kennedy felt the laws were unconstitutional on their face and it did not matter what
standard of review was used. However, in terms of race and gender, the Court’s precedent shows
that the Court can determine the standard of review even if the laws would not even pass rational
basis.
The process of determining race as a suspect classification subject to strict judicial
scrutiny took the Court about thirteen years.17 In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court used
the Equal Protection Clause to reason that laws discriminating based on race were
unconstitutional.18 Though the Court did not apply strict scrutiny to the laws in question, which
denied blacks equal access to educational opportunities, it nonetheless determined that laws
based on race could not stand under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is possible that the Court did
not determine those laws were subject to strict scrutiny because it sought to avoid deciding the
constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws before the Court was ready to take on that
controversy.19 Ten years later in McLaughlin v. Florida the Court re-characterized its
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause to apply strict scrutiny to laws that made
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Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954). Interestingly, in the Obergefell opinion, Justice Kennedy does
not mention Brown and talks about Loving solely in the context of the fundamental right to marry, not class-based
equal protection side of the decision.
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Nicolas, "Obergefell's Squandered Potential," 140. Footnote 23 citing Evan Gerstmann, The Constitutional
Underclass: Gays, Lesbians, and the Failure of Class-Based Equal Protection 36 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999).
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classifications based on race.20 In that case, the Court overturned a Florida criminal statute which
prohibited unmarried interracial couples from habitually living in, and occupying the same room
at night.21 In the ruling, the Court argued one “cannot conceive of a valid legislative
purpose. . .which makes the color of a person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal
offense.”22 Three year later, strict scrutiny was used in Loving v. Virginia to invalidate bans on
interracial marriage, and, as discussed previously, the Court held that the state had no compelling
interest other than invidious racial discrimination to justify the laws.23
The trajectory for gender to be subject to heightened or intermediate scrutiny followed a
similar pattern to that of race. In Reed v. Reed, the Court used the Equal Protection Clause to
strike down laws that discriminated against women (by making sex-based classifications) for the
first time.24 In that ruling the Court struck an Idaho law that specified “males must be preferred
to females” in appointing administrators of estates25 as unconstitutional, reasoning:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other,
merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind
of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause for the
Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not be lawfully mandated
solely on the basis of sex.26
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Two years later in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court then re-characterized the Reed
ruling in a plurality opinion to apply strict scrutiny to the classifications.27 In that decision, the
Court struck down a federal law that allowed wives of members of the military to automatically
become dependents of their husbands, but did not allow husbands of female members of the
military to become dependents, unless they were dependent on their wives for more than half of
their support.28 By 1976 in Craig v. Boren, the Court agreed that intermediate scrutiny would be
used for sex-based classifications.29 In that ruling, the Court invalidated an Oklahoma law that
prohibited the sale of non-alcoholic 3.2 percent beer to males under twenty-one and to females
under eighteen.30 Therefore, from beginning to end, it took the Court just five years to determine
that gender was a semi-suspect class and laws that classified based on gender required
heightened or intermediate scrutiny.
As of today, there is currently no judicial consensus on whether sexual orientation is a
suspect, a quasi-suspect, or a non-suspect classification.31 Although some scholars agree that the
Court has used a more “rigorous” form of rational basis review for laws that classify based on
sexual orientation, the Supreme Court has not been explicit in its terminology. It is important to
note that the Court is prudent when it avoids hastily classifying a group as suspect or semisuspect, as declaring the classification decides most or all future laws impacting a given group,
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Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). (“With these considerations in mind, we can only conclude
that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently
suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Applying the analysis mandated by that stricter
standard of review, it is clear that the statutory scheme now before us is constitutionally invalid.”)
28
Ibid.,
29
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976). (Gender classifications require substantial relation to important
government objectives to pass intermediate scrutiny)
30
Ibid.,
31
Karibjanian, "Obergefell: The Final Word," 34.; Brett Parker, "What Level of Legal Scrutiny Should Sexual
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and thus decides a large number of future controversies.32 The Court understandably wants to
tread carefully before making such a declaration.33 However the Court has had more than enough
time to tread and take a cautious approach to determine the standard of review for sexual
orientation.
As Kennedy noted twice in his Obergefell opinion, there is substantial evidence
supporting the notion that sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic.34 Additionally, in its
amicus brief filed in the case, the United States government presented strong evidence of how
over the course of the last century gays and lesbians were “jailed for having sex, barred from
immigrating to the United States, blacklisted from public employment, stripped of child custody,
and subject to sterilization and castration at judicial whim.”35 Therefore, given homosexuals have
been subject to a history of discrimination; they exhibit an obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristic; and they are a minority with less political power than non-suspect classes, it
would appear that gays and lesbians meet the criteria to be considered a suspect or semi-suspect
class. However, while the Court took approximately thirteen years to determine race was a
suspect classification, and five years to determine gender was a semi-suspect classification, the
Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down laws that target homosexuals without
determining a clear standard of review since 1996, a twenty year period.
Historically there have been several negative consequences of not determining the
standard of review. For one, lower courts have no guidance and have to interpret the
classifications on a case by case basis. The Court’s failure to declare sexual orientation a suspect
or semi-suspect classification in Romer and Lawrence resulted in concrete harm to gays and
32
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lesbians because lower courts have repeatedly upheld laws discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation, such as the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy,36 and laws prohibiting gays and lesbians
from adopting,37 reasoning that only rational basis review applied and that the laws at issue
satisfied that deferential level of review.38
Currently, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth circuits consider sexual orientation a semisuspect classification but the eight other circuits do not. This creates problems and inconsistency
of treatment for homosexuals depending on where they live or file a lawsuit. Additionally, as
will be discussed in the next chapter, without a clear standard of review, state legislatures may
pass laws that classify based on sexual orientation or target homosexuals in other ways. Even
though some of these laws are being challenged in court, there is no guarantee they will need to
pass anything more than the rational basis test. Additionally, the failure to declare sexual
orientation a semi-suspect or suspect classification creates future harm because of the continued
legal uncertainty it creates for gays and lesbians. For example, since Obergefell was laser
focused on marriage without determining the standard of review, the case can be distinguished
from other cases where homosexuals are discriminated against in contexts other than marriage.39
As Garrett Epps notes, perhaps the most obvious implication of not determining the standard of
review is that:
[E]very state discrimination -- whether in adoption, foster care placement, child custody,
health care, employee benefits, and so on, will have to be litigated to determine whether
there’s a [reason] strong enough to allow it. It will be tedious; it will be demeaning; and
(perhaps worse from the justices’ point of view) it will require the Supreme Court to
resolve the issue over and over again.40
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Not surprisingly, the most vocal opponents of determining the standard of review for
sexual orientation are also staunch opponents of same-sex marriage and gay rights generally.
Though it is more difficult now given the scientific evidence that sexual orientation is innate,
they tend to argue that homosexuality is a choice, unlike race and therefore does not deserve to
be treated as an immutable characteristic.41 Additionally, opponents deny that gays are lacking
political power due to the number of gay rights laws enacted by states and Congress over the last
couple of decades. However, as Epps notes:
[A] few years of mixed results cannot wipe out a century of hostility and exclusion. And
it hardly helps the case that some of those forecasting untroubled success for the gay
rights movement are the same people digging in their heels to retard and even reverse
it.42
Additionally, there are several benefits that determining the standard of review would
give to gays and lesbians in America. For one, a clear determination of the standard of review
from the Supreme Court would bind lower courts to use that standard and would also serve as
precedent for any other case that is brought to the Court where a classification is drawn based on
sexual orientation. Second, determining the standard of review would deter governmental actors
from passing laws that classify based on sexual orientation knowing that the laws would be
subjected to a level of scrutiny that the laws would not likely survive. Perhaps most importantly,
a heightened level of scrutiny would “give gays and lesbians a measure of repose, affording them
the same certainty that racial minorities and women have that laws targeting them are unlikely to
be upheld by courts today.”43
That is not to say that declaring the standard of review would solve all of the problems
homosexuals face in America and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would vanish.
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If determining the standard of review was an antidote for discrimination, then racism and sexism,
would no longer exist. Additionally, drawing parallels between sexual orientation and race and
between Loving and Obergefell does not equate them. There are stark and significant differences
between the Gay Rights Movement and the Civil Rights Movement, just as there are between
sexual orientation and race. However, there are parallels between the two, and the comparison
demonstrates that there are many benefits for a class of persons if they are considered a protected
class under the Fourteenth Amendment.
While there was much to celebrate on the day of the Obergefell decision, for some the
opinion produced a pang of uncertainty and disappointment. Despite homosexuals meeting all
the requirements to be a suspect or semi-suspect class, and having four instrumental class based
victories in the Court over the last two decades, the Court in Obergefell chose not to determine
the standard of review. While it is true that Kennedy’s gay rights jurisprudence created the
framework for his Obergefell opinion, and there are some undeniably positive outcomes of the
reasoning used in Obergefell, the opinion also cemented the reality that the fight for gay rights is
long from over.
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Conclusion
Where Do We Go From Here?
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices. . .can a man excuse his practices
to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name
under such circumstances. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-167 (1878).
Anti-Discrimination Laws and Religious Liberty Before and After Obergefell
Before Obergefell there were several cases around the country that were brought against
business owners and government officials who had religious objections to serving gay people in
general, same-sex couples specifically, or providing their services for same-sex weddings.1 Of
the cases brought, several were in states that had anti-discrimination laws covering sexual
orientation in public accommodations.2 In some of the states, same-sex marriage was already
legal and some states had Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRA)3 or RFRA-like language

1

Robert Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., (Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014), cert granted, Super Ct. (U.S. March 2, 2016)
(No. 91615-2) (florist); Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, Civ. No. 11-1-3103-12 ECN, Order (Haw. Circ. Court
1st Cir. Apr. 15, 2013) (bed and breakfast); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 WL 4760453 at *7 (bakery);
Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. CRT 6145-09 (N.J. Div. On Civil Rights Oct. 22, 2015) at 11
(wedding venue); Odgaard v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, No. CVCV046451 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Oct. 7, 2013); Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); Matter of Gifford v. McCarthy No. 520410 (N.Y. App
Div. Jan. 14, 2016) (photographer); Bureau of Labor and Industries of the State of Oregon in the Matter of: Melissa
Elaine Klein, dba Sweet Cakes by Melissa No. 44-14 & 45-14 (2015) (bakery)
2
Colorado, Iowa, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Washington.
3
In reaction to the Court’s decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990) Congress unanimously passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993
which stated: [The] Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, except. . .if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S. Code § 2000bb–1. In Smith, the Court abandoned the strict scrutiny
standard traditionally used for First Amendment cases where plaintiffs sought exemptions. And determined that
neutral, generally applicable laws were constitutional even if the laws burdened religious exercise.
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in their constitutions.4 The circumstances in these cases vary widely, however, this section will
focus on three cases that represent the kinds of claims made by religious objectors.
First, business owners in states that had anti-discrimination laws and RFRA contended
that RFRA demanded they be exempt from following anti-discrimination laws.5 In Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock,6 the New Mexico Supreme Court found that Elane Photography
violated the state’s anti-discrimination law when the owner refused to photograph a same-sex
couple’s commitment ceremony.7 The court determined that the New Mexico Human Rights Act
(NMHRA) did not violate New Mexico’s RFRA because RFRA was not applicable in a suit
between private parties. The court also held that there was no exemption from antidiscrimination laws for creative or expressive professions and the NMHRA sought to promote
equal rights and access to public accommodations by prohibiting discrimination based on certain
specified protected classifications.8 Furthermore, the court rejected Elane Photography’s claim
that the NMHRA violated her freedom of speech and free exercise under the United States and
New Mexico Constitutions.

4

While the original RFRA applied to both the federal government and the states, in 1997 the Supreme Court found
that as applied to the states, RFRA exceeded the power of Congress. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 US 507, 508-509
(1997)) (“All told, RFRA is a considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives and
general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens, and is not designed to identify and
counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion”). Since that ruling, twentytwo states have passed their own RFRA laws, and an additional 12 states have also proposed RFRA style bills in
their state legislatures. While some of these “mini-RFRAs” are modeled after the federal law, several are broader
than the federal version and go beyond the original intent of RFRA. For example, in Florida, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, and Texas, the state RFRAs define “free exercise” as an act or refusal
to act that is substantially motivated by religious beliefs. See Fla. Stat. 761.01 et seq, Ill. Rev.Stat Ch. 775 35/1 et
seq, Kan. Stat 60-5301 et seq, Ky. Rev. Stat 446.350, La. Rev. Stat. 13:5231 et seq, Mo. Rev. Stat. 1.302, NM Stat.
28-22-1 et seq, Tex. Civ. Prac. and remedies code 110.001 et seq.
5
2006 New Mexico Statutes - Section 28-1-7(F). http://law.justia.com/codes/new-mexico/2006/nmrc/jd_28-1-7bcb3.html
6
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P3d at 73 (N.M. 2013).
7
The case was first filed in 2006. Same-sex marriage was not legalized in New Mexico until December 2013. See
table 1 in appendix more information on same-sex marriage in New Mexico.
8
Citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) The Court held that “[i]nvidious private discrimination
may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has
never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.”
99

Second, business owners in states that did not have a RFRA law but had antidiscrimination laws also asserted the burden the law put on their conscience was so harmful, they
needed to be exempt from the laws. For example, in Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.,9 the
Court of Appeals determined that Masterpiece Cakeshop violated the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act (CADA)10 for refusing to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. The
court also determined that CADA did not violate Masterpiece’s freedom of speech and free
exercise of religion protected by the United States and Colorado Constitutions.
Third, government officials in states that have RFRA and no anti-discrimination laws
protecting sexual orientation, asserted RFRA required they be exempt from performing their
official duties of issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples because the action conflicted
with their religious beliefs. In Miller v. Davis,11 a Kentucky district court determined the Free
Exercise Clause did not excuse Kim Davis, an elected government official, from issuing
marriage licenses because of her religious objection to same-sex marriage.12 Davis claimed that
the state had a compelling interest to protect her religious freedom, and forcing her to sign the
marriage licenses violated Kentucky’s RFRA. The court determined that Davis would not suffer
irreparable harm by having her signature on a marriage license issued to a same-sex couple and
her religious beliefs did not excuse her from performing the duties that she took an oath to
perform.13
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Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 WL 4760453 at *7
Section 24-34-601(2)(a), C.R.S. 2014
11
Miller et al., v. Davis et al., 192 L. Ed. 2d 994 (Ky Dist. Ct. 2015).
12
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-44-DLB (Aug. 12, 2015)
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-KY-0006-0006.pdf info
13
Judge Bunning was an appointee of George W. Bush and his father is former Republican Senator Jim Bunning.
See Alan Blinder and Richard Pérez-Peña, "Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, Defying Court,"
The New York Times, September 1, 2015, accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/samesex-marriage-kentucky-kim-davis.html?_r=0. http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-KY-0006-0006.pdf
10
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In cases like Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock and Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Inc, the two conflicting rights were the right to not be discriminated against in places of public
accommodation and the constitutional right to free speech and free exercise of religion. In Miller
v. Davis, the rights in question were the fundamental right to marry and the right to free exercise
of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment. Each of the cases came down in favor of the
LGBT plaintiffs, and although two of them were appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court did
not take the cases.14 Additionally, some of the cases dealing with similar conflicts are awaiting
resolution in the appeals process in various state courts.15 As a result of these small business
owners and government officials losing in court, there has been legislation passed at the state
level to grant them the exemptions they seek and to protect them from being sued for breaking
anti-discrimination laws.16 Because religious groups were failing in their arguments in state
courts, they developed an argument based on a countervailing right because it allows them to
turn the discrimination question on its head. Religious groups now contend that by forcing
business owners and people like Kim Davis to follow the law, religious observers are being
discriminated against.17
This claim asserts that private business owners and government employees should be
accommodated for their beliefs regardless if that accommodation results in the defiance of anti14

Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P3d at 73; Miller et al., v. Davis et al., 192 L. Ed. 2d 994 (Ky Dist. Ct.
2015);
15
Robert Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., (Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014), cert granted, Super Ct. (U.S. March 2,
2016) (No. 91615-2). The Washington Supreme Court granted certiorari and oral arguments are expected in a matter
of months.
16
Some states have introduced RFRAs, others have introduced marriage related religious exemption laws, some
have introduced First Amendment Defense Acts as well as acts to exempt government employees, commercial
wedding services, and other things from generally applicable laws. Bills regarding religious exemptions in the
realms of adoption and foster care, college and university student groups, access to health services, and more have
also been introduced. See ACLU, "Anti-LGBT Religious Exemption Legislation across the Country," ACLU,
accessed April 16, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/anti-lgbt-religious-exemption-legislation-acrosscountry?redirect=lgbt-rights/anti-lgbt-religious-refusals-legislation-across-country.
17
Bobby Jindal, "Bobby Jindal: I'm Holding Firm Against Gay Marriage," The New York Times, April 23, 2015,
accessed April 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/opinion/bobby-jindal-im-holding-firm-against-gaymarriage.html?_r=0.
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discrimination laws or the fundamental right to marry. While religious exemptions have been
given in the past for military service, swearing oaths, school attendance, and alcohol use, those
were for minorities, and exemptions on a large scale were limited to religious organizations or
places of worship.18
This argument requires religious liberty to trump the state’s compelling interest in rooting
out discrimination. While the courts in cases the discussed above rejected these claims, the fact
that the defendants are making them at all is remarkable, particularly since no state has ever
exempted commercial business owners or government employees from the obligation to provide
services for interracial marriage, interfaith marriage, or marriage involving divorced individuals
even though major religious traditions in America have opposed them.19 This fact undermines
any argument that commercial business owners should be exempt from anti-discrimination
laws.20
Interestingly, during the Civil Rights Movement the demand for religious exemptions
from anti-discrimination laws was scarce, and the objections that were voiced were not taken
seriously.21 While some religious exemptions did exist in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they did

18

For example, during prohibition, the Catholic Church was still able to use wine. Also see Mark David Hall,
"Religious Accommodations and the Common Good," The Heritage Foundation, last modified October 26, 2015,
accessed October 30, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/10/religious-accommodations-and-thecommon-good.
19
As Oleske notes, even though many Americans had religious objections to interracial marriage in the 1960s,
federal and state anti-discrimination laws never included exemptions allowing business owners to deny services
based on those beliefs. Additionally, although the New Testament quotes Jesus condemning divorce and remarriage
as against the Ten Commandments, state laws prohibiting discrimination based on marital status do not contain
exemptions allowing commercial businesses or individuals with “sincerely held religious beliefs” to refuse to
facilitate the remarriages of divorced people. Oleske, "The Evolution of Accommodation," 144 footnotes 230-235.
20
Ibid., 146
21
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises 390 US 400, 402 n5 (1968) (The Supreme Court rejected as “patently
frivolous” a restaurant owner’s argument that, by prohibiting racial discrimination, the 1964 Civil Rights Act
“constitute[d] an interference with the free exercise of the Defendant’s religion” (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted)). The lower court opinion explicitly addressed this argument stating: “undoubtedly defendant
Bessinger has a constitutional right to espouse the religious beliefs of his own choosing, however, he does not have
the absolute right to exercise and practice such beliefs in utter disregard of the clear constitutional rights of other
citizens. This court refuses to lend credence or support to his position that he has a constitutional right to refuse to
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not go beyond protecting the right of churches and other places of worship to hire ministers and
other officials of their faith.22 Additionally, while exemptions have been given in the past, it was
generally understood that including broad exemptions for religiously or morally motivated
individuals during the civil rights era would have made the laws less effective and would have
changed the message sent by the laws:23
The message sent by allowing religious exemptions [in the commercial realm] is that
discrimination is wrong and illegal except when it is right and legal. It is illegal and
wrong unless your deeply held religious beliefs support [it]. . . The right to discriminate
can convey a message that it is right to do so.24
While these principles have generally been understood as reasonable in states that have
anti-discrimination laws, today the religious right seeks broad exemptions from antidiscrimination laws that apply to any individual or group that has a sincerely held religious belief
about LGBT persons or same-sex marriage. While religious freedom has always been an
important tenet of American society, it has also always been understood to have its limits.
However, currently the arguments for exemptions in the name of religious liberty are unlimited,
and religious liberty is seen as a trump card by those who seek exemptions for private business
owners and government officials. Of course there is no doubt that their religious beliefs are
sincere, or deeply held, but, as the courts in the cases described above recognized, there would be
immense harm to individuals and society if exemptions for such individuals from antidiscrimination laws were allowed.
In cases of civil servants such as clerks and magistrates, exemptions should not be
granted to them because they are agents of the government and have a responsibility to enforce

serve members of the Negro race in his business establishments upon the ground that to do so would violate his
sacred religious beliefs.” See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises 256 F.Supp 941, 945 (1966) emphasis added.
22
Curtis, "A Unique Religious Exemption," 179-180.
23
Ibid., 176
24
Ibid., 203.
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and apply the laws equally. In cases of business owners who provide goods and services, they
should not be granted exemptions because there is immense harm that arises when businesses
open to the public deny services in such a way that discriminates, even if their objection is rooted
in faith. Additionally, the harm to the individual and to society as a whole is not minimized
simply because the individual can go somewhere else for the same service.25
While it is true that determining the standard of review for sexual orientation was not
necessary to win those three cases before or after Obergefell, determining the standard of review
would have helped. For one, even though the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state rather than
private actors, in setting a clear standard, governments could argue there is a compelling state
interest to root out discrimination in the private sector. Additionally, the Supreme Court has
determined that laws have an improper purpose when they accommodate private prejudice.26
Furthermore, determining the standard would make laws that place homosexuals, or same-sex
couples, in a disfavored class because of their sexual orientation harder to defend. While there is
a compelling interest in protecting the religious liberty of all people, there is also a compelling
interest to not have that freedom interfere with other people’s freedom and civil liberties.27
However, without a clear standard of review, the Court in Obergefell gave deference to the states
to decide, which also gave states a freer hand to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
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Louise Melling et al., Drawing the Line: Tackling Tensions Between Religious Freedom and Equality, 22-23,
September 2015, accessed April 25, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/inc15-reportdrawingtheline-rel1.pdf.
26
For example in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court held the government “may not avoid the
strictures of [the Equal Protection] Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body
politic. ‘Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot directly or indirectly, give them
effect.’” 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1983) quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 446 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). However, by selectively
accommodating commercial discrimination against same-sex couples that was not previously permitted against other
disfavored couples, the proposed exemptions would give private objections validation. See Oleske 145
27
Michael Nava and Robert Dawidoff, Created Equal: Why Gay Rights Matter to America (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1994), 88.
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Therefore, determining whether there is a compelling state interest to root out discrimination will
likely turn on state court interpretations of state law.
At the state level after Obergefell, attorney generals, governors, clerks, judges and
senators across the country decried the decision as a blatant judicial overstep and some even
vowed to have the decision overturned with a constitutional amendment.28 While there were
varying degrees of the ferocity of responses, several conservative legislatures declared they
would act tirelessly to ensure that religious observers would not have to act in any way that
conflicted with their conscience. In the months preceding Obergefell and immediately following
the decision, dozens of bills have been introduced in thirty-one states to protect persons whose
religious convictions prevent them from serving the LGBT community in one way or another.29
Of those 31 states, eleven have existing RFRA laws and of those eleven, four have existing antidiscrimination laws covering sexual orientation.30

28

In Kentucky, 60 clerks signed a petition to the Governor saying they objected to the ruling on religious grounds,
however, most decided to issue licenses in fear of losing their jobs. In Alabama, probate judges in 13 of the 67
counties refused to issue marriage licenses at all, and one Judge in Washington County called for a “landmark
ruling” to defy the Supreme Court. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Kentucky Clerk Defies Court on Marriage Licenses
for Gay Couples," The New York Times, August 13, 2013, accessed October 26, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/us/kentucky-rowan-county-same-sex-marriage-licenses-kim-davis.html;
Andrew Rosenthal, "The Instant Republican Backlash on Gay Marriage," The New York Times, June 26, 2015, The
Opinionator, http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/the-instant-republican-backlash-on-gay-marriage/.
29
See ACLU, "Anti-LGBT Religious Exemption Legislation across the Country," ACLU, accessed April 16, 2016,
https://www.aclu.org/anti-lgbt-religious-exemption-legislation-across-country?redirect=lgbt-rights/anti-lgbtreligious-refusals-legislation-across-country.
30
Existing RFRA laws: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, Maine,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico. RFRA and Non-discrimination laws: Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
Mexico.
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Figure 2. States that Introduced Religious Exemption Bills during 2015 or 2016.31

One of the most far reaching of these bills was passed in North Carolina.32 Known as
HB2, the bill was drafted by Republican lawmakers in response to the passage of a Charlotte
ordinance that expanded anti-discrimination laws to cover sexual orientation and gender identity,
and allowed transgender persons to use public restrooms that aligned with their gender identity.33
HB2 overrides Charlotte’s ordinance, forces people to use bathrooms that match their birth
gender, prohibits any local governments from passing anti-discrimination laws to protect LGBT
31

Colored states indicates states where bills were introduced. Orange indicates states with existing RFRA laws,
Green indicates states with existing RFRA laws and existing anti-discrimination laws.
32
Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ G.S. 115C, 143-81, 95-25, 153A, 160A (2016). In
May 2015, the legislature also passed a bill SB2 that allows state court officials to refuse to perform a marriage if
they have a “sincerely held religious objection,” to it. The law is not limited to same-sex marriage -- a magistrate
could also refuse to perform an interracial or interfaith wedding. Governor McCrory vetoed the bill stating “no
public official who voluntarily swears to support and defend the Constitution and to discharge all duties of their
office should be exempt from upholding that oath.” The GOP controlled state Senate overrode his veto on June 1,
2015. Jonathan Katz, "North Carolina Allows Officials to Refuse to Perform Gay Marriages," New York Times, June
11, 2015, accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/us/north-carolina-allows-officials-to-refuseto-perform-gay-marriages.html?_r=0.
33
The legislature introduced and HB2 in a matter of hours, and the Governor signed it the same day. Mark Berman,
"PayPal Abandons Plans to Open Facility in Charlotte Because of LGBT Law," The Washington Post, April 5, 2016,
accessed April 16, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/04/05/paypal-abandonsplans-to-open-facility-in-charlotte-due-to-lgbt-law/. Steve Harrison, "Charlotte City Council Approves LGBT
Protections in 7-4 Vote," The Charlotte Oberver (Charlotte, NC), February 22, 2016, accessed April 16, 2016,
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article61786967.html.
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persons, and prevents individuals from suing for discrimination in state court.34 While the
bathroom aspect of the bill has garnered the most attention from opponents of HB2 and the
press,35 the most extreme aspect of the North Carolina law is the provision blocking the passage
or enactment of any local laws that seek to protect the LGBT community. This provision is
strikingly similar to Colorado’s Amendment 2 deemed unconstitutional in Romer v. Evans. In
response, the ACLU has challenged HB2 and sued in a district court in North Carolina.36 While
to some the bill is unconstitutional on its face and cannot even pass the rational basis test, it is
uncertain how the case will be decided. However, had the standard of review been determined in
Obergefell, North Carolina would have a difficult time convincing the court that the bill can
withstand heightened scrutiny.
While North Carolina’s law has been in the spotlight since Governor McCrory signed it,
it is not a novel piece of legislation. Similar bills were also passed in Georgia and South Dakota
and the Governors in both states vetoed the legislation after immense pressure from the business
community and civil rights groups in those states.37 Additionally, Mississippi passed a similar
law that goes further than Georgia’s and North Carolina’s. The law prevents the government
from “discriminating”38 against a “person”39 for acting on their religious convictions regarding
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Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ G.S. 115C, 143-81, 95-25, 153A, 160A (2016).
Interestingly, just 10 days after HB2 was signed, the members in North Carolina’s House and Senate introduced
versions of a bill that would do just that. While both measures have been sent to committee, the state legislature does
not reconvene until weeks later. See ACLU, "LGBT Nondiscrimination and Anti-LGBT Bills across the Country,"
ACLU, accessed April 16, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-nondiscrimination-and-anti-lgbt-bills-acrosscountry#affirmnondisc.
36
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Joaquín Carcaño et al., v. Patrick McCrory et al No. 1:16-cv-236
(2016).
37
Alan Blinder and Richard Perez-Pena, "Georgia Governor Rejects Bill Shielding Critics of Gay Marriage," The
New York Times, March 28, 2016, accessed April 16, 2016, http://nyti.ms/22UcDMp.; Ralph Ellis and Emanuella
Grinberg, "Georgia Gov. Nathan Deal to Veto 'Religious Liberty' Bill," CNN, last modified March 28, 2016,
accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/28/us/georgia-north-carolina-lgbt-bills/index.html; Stern,
"Mississippi Governor Signs LGBTQ," Outward: Extending the LGBTQ Conversation (blog).
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H.B 1523 §4(a)-(g) 2016 Reg. Sess. (Ms. 2016).
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H.B 1523 §9.3(a)-(d) 2016 Reg. Sess. (Ms. 2016). Defines person as (a) an individual; (b) religious organization;
(c) closely held company, sole proprietorship, partnership, association, organization, firm, corporation, trust, society,
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sexuality and marriage.40 Under the law, the government cannot, for example, prevent businesses
from firing a transgender employee, clerks from refusing to issue a marriage license to a samesex couple, or landlords from refusing to rent to an LGBT person.41 Additionally, persons and
companies that provide marriage-related services like venue owners, photographers, bakers and
florists are sheltered from being prosecuted for discriminating.42
While North Carolina’s bill is being challenged in court, had Kennedy determined the
standard of review, it would be harder for the state and other states that pass similar laws to
prove exemptions for public and private actors from anti-discrimination laws are substantially
related to the compelling interest of protecting religious liberty. In other words, had Kennedy
given a clear standard, it would be used as a tool by which civil rights groups could address the
strength of the Equal Protection Clause argument made by challengers to the anti-discrimination
laws. While it is undeniable that the First Amendment protects the right to believe that
homosexuality and same-sex marriage are sins, never before have religious exemptions been
validated as means to discriminate or harm other people by denying government services or
public accommodations of various kinds.
Both Mississippi and North Carolina have paid a price for passing such laws that are so
far reaching into the private commercial realm. For example, in North Carolina, businesses like
or other closely held entity; or (d) cooperatives, ventures, or enterprises comprised or two or more individuals or
entities.
40
H.B 1523 §2 (a)-(c) 2016 Reg. Sess. (Ms. 2016). The sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions
protected by this act are the belief or conviction that: (a) marriage is or should be recognized as a unions of one man
and one woman; (b) sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage; and (c) Male (man) or female
(woman) refer to an individual’s immutable biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at the
time of birth.
41
Sarah Kaplan, "Mississippi's Senate Just Approved a Sweeping 'Religious Liberty' Bill the Critics Say Is the
Worst yet for LGBT Rights," The Washington Post, March 31, 2016, accessed April 16, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/03/31/mississippis-senate-just-approved-a-sweepingreligious-liberty-bill-that-critics-say-is-the-worst-yet-for-lgbt-rights/.; Stern, "Mississippi Governor Signs LGBTQ,"
Outward: Extending the LGBTQ Conversation (blog).
42
Furthermore, the bill allows doctors to refuse to provide counseling, sex-reassignment surgery, fertility treatments,
and other services and allows companies and schools to establish sex-specific policies regarding dress and bathroom
use. See ibid.,
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PayPal and Deutsche Bank backed out of multimillion dollar investments that would have
brought thousands of jobs to the state.43 Additionally, the Governor of New York and Mayor of
DC have issued official travel bans to North Carolina.44 The law also garnered international
attention when the British government issued a travel warning for its citizens telling them to
avoid North Carolina and Mississippi if they identify as a member of the LGBT community.45
Given the fervent animosity towards the law, the Governor issued an executive order to alter the
equal employment policy for state workers to cover discrimination claims related to sexual
orientation and gender identity.46
Pressure from the business community may ultimately force states that pass these laws to
abandon them because they are not economically viable. However, even with corporate pressure,
without a clear standard of review, gays and lesbians will continue to be denied equal protection
under the law, and then will have to go back to court for every issue that they encounter.
Additionally, lower courts have no guidance and have to rely heavily on state laws and interpret
them on a case-by-case basis.
Historically, the Court’s failure to declare sexual orientation a suspect or semi-suspect
classification in Romer and Lawrence resulted in concrete harm to gays and lesbians because
lower courts had, until recently, determined that laws barring homosexuals from openly serving
in the military and laws prohibiting gays and lesbians from adopting, passed the rational basis
test. Determining the standard of review would not have stopped unfair treatment in every
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situation, but it would have made it much harder for public and private actors to treat
homosexuals as second class citizens in those cases and the same is true post-Obergefell.
***
Eventually the Court will determine the standard of review for sexual orientation. Justice
Kennedy may no longer be on the Court when the standard is determined, but given that
homosexuals have been subject to a history of discrimination; they exhibit an obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristic; and they are a minority with less political power than
non-suspect classes, it is undeniably clear that gays and lesbians meet the criteria to be
considered a semi-suspect class. As shown throughout this thesis, failing to determine the
standard of review for gays and lesbians almost guarantees present and future harm. When the
Court does determine the standard, lower courts will have binding precedent to apply to laws that
place members of the LGBT community in a disfavored class, and government officials at all
levels may be deterred from passing such laws knowing they will be unlikely to survive.
Additionally, determining the standard will also make it more difficult for private actors seeking
exemptions from generally applicable laws to discriminate against the LGBT community in the
name of religious liberty.
While it is uncertain how long it will take the Court to determine the standard of review,
there are steps that can be taken in the meantime to protect homosexuals and other members of
the LGBT community. For one, the federal government can amend existing anti-discrimination
laws or pass new laws covering sexual orientation and gender identity. Currently there is not a
comprehensive federal law that bans discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity in credit, education, employment, federal funding, housing, jury service, and public
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accommodations.47 The absence of federal protections from discrimination means that
homosexuals and other LGBT persons are more susceptible to discrimination and are largely
powerless to combat such discrimination in many cases.48 Therefore, even though same-sex
couples around the country have the right to marry after Obergefell, they still have no federal
protections against being denied a loan for buying a home,49 being fired from their job,50 or being
told they cannot be served in a restaurant.
The current lack of federal anti-discrimination laws barring discrimination based on
sexual orientation has meant that many states and municipalities have been responsible for
protecting, or not protecting, the LGBT community from discrimination. While some states have
expanded existing anti-discrimination laws to protect LGBT persons, others have not. This
inconsistency creates a patchwork of protections and uncertainty among homosexuals and the
LGBT community as a whole.
Currently in the United States, 28 states have no laws prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, and 31 states lack explicit gender identity nondiscrimination
protections.51 Within these states, some cities and counties have passed their own anti-
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discrimination laws covering sexual orientation, gender identity, or a combination of both.52
Additionally, some Governors have issued executive orders prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation or gender identity in various states.53 However, these orders are frequently
limited to state employees, and the protections can be rescinded by future Governors.
In contrast, 23 states and the District of Columbia have enacted anti-discrimination laws
that bar discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.54 Even within these
states, however, the protections are inconsistent, as some laws only include sexual orientation,
and not gender identity.55 Homosexual, bisexual, or transgender persons in America who lack
protections against discrimination at the federal and state level, are subject to the personal views
or biases of potential employers, lenders, merchants, or real estate agents. If the federal
government was to amend existing anti-discrimination laws to cover sexual orientation and
gender identity, then it would offer protections for LGBT persons in 28 states without any antidiscrimination laws. Additionally, should the federal government amend existing or pass new
laws, then the state governments would have to enforce the federal laws.
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Figure 3. Statewide Anti-discrimination Laws Protecting on the Basis of Sexual Orientation (LGB*) or Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity (LGBT).56

Figure 4. Anti-discrimination Laws Protecting LGB(T) Persons from Discrimination in Employment57
56

This map reflects states that have anti-discrimination laws in employment. Some of the states included do not
cover housing, credit, or public accommodations. Those that cover more than employment may cover just sexual
orientation in some areas, but cover sexual orientation and gender identity in others.
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Following the Obergefell decision in 2015, Rep. David Cicilline (D-RI) in the House and
Senator Jeff Merkley reintroduced the Equality Act58 which would amend the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to add sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of already protected classes.59
Additionally the law included a provision to add sex as a class that is protected from
discrimination in public accommodations, since that is not currently included, and the law would
widen the definition of a public accommodation.60 While the bill has overwhelming Democratic
support, the bill is unlikely to pass before the November elections. Therefore, it is unclear if the
protections will come before the standard of review; however, if the standard comes first, the
federal protections will likely follow.
That is not to say that declaring the standard of review would solve all of the problems
the LGBT community faces in America and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity would vanish. If determining the standard of review was an antidote for
discrimination, then racism and sexism would no longer exist. Scrutiny does not operate as a
silver bullet to create a utopian society where no one is ever denied their civil rights.
Nevertheless, a higher level of scrutiny allows anti-discrimination laws to ultimately be enforced.
Justice Kennedy’s gay rights jurisprudence on the Supreme Court has changed the
trajectory of the Gay Rights Movement and helped solidify the progress homosexuals have made
57

Map does not show the patchwork of laws for discrimination laws in other areas such as housing, public
accommodations, and credit.
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in achieving justice and equality under the law. From the time of his Beller opinion on the Ninth
Circuit to Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and finally with Obergefell, Justice Kennedy developed
the language for the Court to talk about homosexuals as human beings, and afford them the equal
dignity they deserve. While there are obvious reasons to celebrate the Obergefell decision, for
some the opinion produced a pang of uncertainty and disappointment. Despite homosexuals
meeting all the requirements to be considered a suspect or semi-suspect class, and having four
instrumental class based victories in the Supreme Court over the last two decades, Kennedy in
Obergefell chose not to determine the standard of review. While Justice Kennedy has single
handedly enlarged the scope of legal protections for homosexuals, his failure to take the next step
and provide them with the status of a protected class means that there is still more work to be
done.
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Alabama
1
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1
1
2006
1
1998
0
Supreme Court
6/26/15
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1
0
10/12/14
0
1
1998
1
1996
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Ninth Circuit
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1
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1
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1
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1
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1
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1
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0
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0
0
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0
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1
1
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0
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1
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1
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0
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1
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1
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0
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1
1
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1
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0
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1
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0
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1
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1
1
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0
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Supreme Court
6/26/15
Nevada
1
1
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0
1
2002
0
0*
Ninth Circuit
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1
1
2007
1/1/10
0
0
1
1987
1
New Jersey
0
1
2007
10/31/13
0
0
0
0
Mercer County Superior Court 9/27/13
New Mexico
0
0
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0
0
0
0
New Mexico Supreme Court
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New York
0
0
7/24/11
0
0
0
1
North Carolina
1
0
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0
0
1
1996
0
Fourth Circuit
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North Dakota
1
0
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1
1
2004
0
0
Supreme Court
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1
0
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1
1
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1
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0
Supreme Court
6/26/13
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1
0
10/6/14
0
1
2004
1
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0
Tenth Circuit
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Oregon
1
0
5/19/14
0
1
2004
0
0
U.S. District Court
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Pennsylvania
1
0
5/20/14
0
0
1
1996
0
U.S. District Court
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1
1
2011
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0
0
0
1
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1
0
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1
2006
1
1996
0
Fourth Circuit
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South Dakota
1
0
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1
1
2006
0
0
Supreme Court
6/26/15
Tennessee
1
0
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1
1
2006
1
1996
0
Supreme Court
6/26/15
Texas
1
0
6/26/15
1
1
2005
1
1997
0
Supreme Court
6/26/15
Utah
1
0
10/6/14
0
1
2004
1
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0
Tenth Circuit
10/6/14
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1
1
2000
9/1/09
0
0
0
1
Virginia
1
0
10/6/14
0
1
2006
1
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0
Fourth Circuit
10/6/14
Washington
1
1
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12/6/12
0
0
1
1998
1
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1
0
10/9/14
0
0
1
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0
Fourth Circuit
10/6/14
Wisconsin
1
1
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10/6/14
0
1
2006
0
0
Seventh Circuit
9/4/14
Wyoming
1
0
10/21/14
0
0
1
1977
0
Tenth Circuit
10/6/14
TOTAL:
45
16
15
30
33
12
Source: Freedom to Marry
*In May 2013 the state legislature voted in favor of a measure that began a multi-year process of amending the Nevada Constitution. Before that process was over, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of same-sex marriage
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Table 1. Explanation
This table shows the trajectory of same-sex marriage in the 50 United States and the District of
Columbia. The column titled “Ban” indicates whether or not a state ever had a ban on same-sex
marriage in place (1 indicates yes, 0 indicates no). “Civil unions?” indicates whether or not the
state ever enacted civil unions, which, before nationwide marriage equality, offered same-sex
couples some benefits of marriage without the official designation. For the 16 states that did
enact civil unions, the “When?” column corresponds with the year civil unions were passed and
implemented in those states. The “Date of SSM Legalization” represents the date that the court
ruling or legislation legalizing same-sex marriage went into effect. For some of the states, samesex couples were not able to marry until days, weeks, or months after a court ruled on a case or a
Governor signed a bill. The “Overturned with Obergefell?” column indicates the states that were
affected by the Obergefell decision. “Constitutional Ban” indicates states that had constitutional
bans on same-sex marriage. Most of these were characterized by constitutional definitions of
“marriage” as a union between a man and a woman. The next column demonstrates when the
state passed the measure. Normally the constitutional amendments were approved by voter
referendum. “Statutory Ban” indicates states that implemented statutory bans barring same-sex
marriage, and the subsequent column indicates the date when the measure was passed. The
“legalized via legislation” column indicates whether or not same-sex marriage was legalized by
the state legislature. The “ban overturned by court ruling” indicates states that had their same-sex
marriage ban(s) struck down by a judicial body. The next column indicates which court made the
decision and the last column indicates the day the court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage.
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